

CARTESIANISM REVISITED: THE GHOST IN THE MOVING MACHINE
OR IN THE LIVED BODY. AN ETHOGENIC CRITIQUE.

The Body-Dead Brain-Dead Axiom in the Behavioral Sciences

In the introduction to a collection of ethnographic studies of action-sign systems, Farnell alludes to the intersection of anthropology and philosophy on the issue of Cartesianism and its relationship to human movement (Farnell in press). Of concern is the fact that Cartesian dualism is a constituent component of social theories in the behavioral sciences. The human being is thereby presumed to be a veritable ghost in the social machinery of cultural life. In other words, the behavioral sciences endemically presume a disembodied actor. This means that neither gestures nor other bodily movements are subsumed under the description of 'action' but are seen only as 'behavior'. At issue is not only the failure to include the body in references to the actor, but the failure to regard body-movement as genuine action. I will refer to this phenomenon as the 'body-dead/brain-dead axiom'.

The body-dead/brain-dead axiom is to be distinguished from Bryan Turner's discussion of the neglect of the body in social theory in which he identifies both an absence and a furtive history (1984). While Turner talks of the absence of embodiment, he does not include movement and therefore the genuine agency of the body. This does not mean that he rejects the agentic nature of body-movement; on the contrary, his three prescriptions for an "adequate sociology of the body" are consistent with such an inclusion. This paper provides a conceptual clarification of his call for "embodiment [as the] exercise of. . . some form of corporeal government" (1984:245).

It is my contention that until this axiom is understood, successfully challenged, and dismissed, the disembodied actor is likely to remain ensconced as a category in our interpretive endeavors. On the other hand, however, if attempts to include the embodied actor fail to engage in a justified dismissal of the axiom, such inclusion, however well intentioned, is likely to be ad hoc and unsystematic. The consequence of this professional goodheartedness and alertness to the fashions of the day will be that the rest of the discipline may not be convinced to take it seriously. In this paper I will address this problem of the 'body-dead/brain-dead axiom' and present a way to understand and challenge it so that a dismissal is both justified and sufficiently convincing to engage our professional seriousness. I dedicate this effort to all the scholars whose work is represented in this collection --

their seriousness has inspired my effort and informed its realization.

To realize this difficult aim I will focus on a particular philosophical solution to the problem that has become a special favorite of late among both sociologists and anthropologists. I refer to the Merleau-Pontian notion of the "lived-body" and its autonomous "bodily-intentionality." I will do so first of all by looking at this notion itself in the context of Merleau-Ponty's existential phenomenology and his philosophy of history. Second, I will examine this notion as it has been used by the philosopher and dancer, Maxine Sheets-Johnstone, and as it has been accepted by the anthropologist and poet, Michael Jackson. My central contention is that the notion of the "lived-body" or "bodily-intentionality" is a sensitizing and not a definitive conceptual solution to the problem of the disembodied actor in the behavioral sciences. Thus phenomenological existentialism is viewed as a transitional position and not a final one. A similar position regarding the contributions of Merleau-Ponty has also been advocated recently by Marjorie Grene (1985) in her discussion of the new biology and the new philosophy of science. For example, Merleau-Ponty's The Structure of Behaviour (1967) and The Phenomenology of Perception (1989[1945]) are now scientifically out of date, and the theory of perception developed in the latter has been updated by the perceptual theory of J.J. Gibson.

For an understanding of the cogency of this judgement two integrally connected strategies will be pursued. First, I will show that there are certain internal conceptual difficulties in Merleau-Ponty's notion of the lived-body within his existential phenomenology and that he was in the process of transcending those difficulties in his ventures into the philosophy of history. The second strategy is the analytical means with which to carry forth the first. That means will be the ethogenic standpoint of Rom Harré and especially the new realist philosophy of science that grounds that standpoint.

Harré's specific service to us in reference to the internal conceptual difficulties of the notion of the lived body is the idea that, contrary to the Humean tradition that prevails in philosophy and the behavioral sciences, the ideas of substance, causation, and agency are intrinsically connected and compatible with each other. In this light, human agency entails both that the person is a real entity - a substance -- and that agency is a real causal event. The notion of the lived-body does not entail an entitative concept (substance) of the individual, the subject, and so lacks a genuine concept of the person. On the other hand,

however, it represents an ambiguous location of agency. We shall see that a concept of person is genuine only insofar as it is grounded in the ideas of substance, causation, and agency. The surrogate concept of 'subject' involves only the idea of agency; it has no real power or force. The 'subject' is thus a free-floating quality; it is not grounded in substance. The notion of lived-body was a rejection of the Cartesian trick of privileging the mind as agentic to the exclusion of the body; but, without a concept of person, the body itself is ambiguously granted agency. To be sure, Merleau-Ponty suggested that 'mind' and 'body' are both centered in, and mediated by, the subject's being-in-the-world, but this does not resolve the ambiguity regarding the location of agency.

What is crucial here is that two issues are in danger of being conflated. One is the issue of agency and the body, and the other is the issue of the theoretical status of being-in-the-world and its relationship to person and agency. With regard to the issue of agency and the body, as might be expected, Merleau-Ponty considers "bodily-intentionality" to account for it: the agency of the body is claimed as an "ultimate fact," that is, a fact of which he only knows that it is so and not how it is so (Russow 1988:41-42). Reversing the center of privilege in Cartesian dualism from 'mind' to 'body' is ultimately rooted in the tacit acceptance of the conceptual incompatibility of causation, substance and agency presumed by the Humean tradition. If mind is a ghost in the machinery of the body, moving or not, the body is the only reality left for the location of agency. If the body as machine, the objective body, is rejected as such because of its deterministic status, then the body as 'lived', the subjective body, must be accepted as the only remaining alternative to determinism. Somehow, as a Jamesian act of faith, the body is not viewed as deterministic as long as it is 'lived', and therefore, it is assumed, the subjective body must be the only proper location for agency.

The difficulty with the Merleau-Pontian notion resides in the fact that the agency of the body -- its intentionality -- is acausal because Merleau Ponty tacitly associates causation with determinism. This means that the intentionality of the body cannot be genuinely agentic; that is, the 'force' of bodily intention is as ghostly as the 'force' of the mind! Clearly then, the notion of lived-body as an anti-Cartesian basis for a conception of the embodied actor doesn't work, and does not because it cannot. The status of intentionality, mental or bodily, remains problematic for the precise reason that the actuality of the body cannot establish the reality of intentionality. As long as the agentic status of intentionality is implicitly

taken to be acausal, neither the facticity of the body -- the objective body -- nor the experientiality of the body -- the subjective body -- can grant intentionality the status of reality. For, the reality of the agency of intentionality is the power of causation, and that power belongs to a person not an intention. People intend, not bodies; minds don't intend, people do. And, as I intend to show, people are causal in their agency because as persons they are social.

A Harréan turn in our philosophical understanding of causation and agency, person and the social, mind and body, will permit us to regard people in a different way. People are necessarily social and so are socially interacting persons employing their discretionary causal powers of authorship in the use of mental and bodily predicates in the deployment of various semiotic systems. This is my reading of the significance of Urciuoli's correction of traditional linguistic theory in its neglect of the social constructional activity of language-in-use and action-sign systems, and her correction of Habermasian communicative theory with its focus on the speech act and omission of action-sign systems. Utilizing Drid Williams's fruitful conception of the signifying act, Urciuoli has transcended the limitations of these two theories by including both action-sign systems and social constructional activity.

Indeed, it is in reference to the conception of the signifying act that Merleau-Ponty's venture into the philosophy of history will be revealing. In the last decade of his life he crossed over from the ambiguous notion of being-in-the-world into a sociolinguual and gestural construal of Heidegger's notoriously persistent notion. But there is where Merleau-Ponty left it. It will be my contention that Sheets-Johnstone's and Jackson's resort to the notion of the lived body, to be examined later, tends to restrict them to Merleau-Ponty's existential phenomenology, thus depriving them of the liberating perspective of his expansion into the philosophy of history. As a consequence, both scholars have missed the fact that the idea of bodily intentionality was sensitizing but not definitive, and they have overlooked its transitional status. The import of this is the recognition that Merleau-Ponty's promising position stands as an invitation for us to realize what he could not, the systematic connection between language and gesture.

I will show that such a connection can be made through the concept of the signifying act, but not through the concept of the lived-body and its gestural expressiveness, nor its refinement into the lovely idea of the body as flesh. Resort to the latter in the work of Sheets-Johnstone and Jackson thus constitutes a degenerate form of Merleau-

Ponty's conception because they merely re-state the concept and ignore his invitation to tackle the problem of language and gesture. They are thereby blocked from developing a conception of the signifying act. This means that while they may be able to avoid the intellectualist fallacy of 'talking about the body' -- the observed body -- they can only do so by committing the phenomenalist fallacy of 'talking of the body' -- the experienced (or felt) body. They are never able to 'talk from the body' -- the enacted body.

The concept of the signifying act allows us to deal systematically with the enacted body, that is the person agentically deploying a semiotic system for body movement in the cultural space of social action. And in that systematic treatment, ethnographic description can make the profound shift from accounts of movement in word-glosses to accounts in movement scores. Which is to say, to descriptive accounts backed up by rigorous textual methodologies. Ultimately, 'talking from the body' means that the movement itself is transcribed and the movement itself is read. And this is exactly what one does not find and will never be able to find in any work produced by either Sheets-Johnstone or Jackson, the point being that their philosophical commitment is responsible. As we shall see, it must be concluded that their significant contribution to the problem of the disembodied actor in social theory is a clear demonstration that a Merleau-Pontian anthropology of the body is a dead-end.

The Axiom of the Disembodied Actor and Modern Individualism

It is important to remind ourselves that the problem of the body is itself subsumed under the broader and prior problem of western individualism and modern society. (The point of the reminder is that people or persons -- not minds or bodies -- have worked out a new language with which to define themselves and understand themselves.) With the rise of modernity, the organic-realist conception of the individual and the mechanistic-nominalist conception of the individual come into conflict. The organic-realist view formally represents the Judeo-Greco-Christian tradition in which the individual is conceived as a differentiation from within an organically and spiritually defined living whole. Formally speaking, the 'one' and the 'many' (unity and diversity; God and man/woman; member and group; constant and variable; essence and accident) are connected in a special whole-part relationship. The 'one' as a unified whole is a transcendent supernatural or super-empirical reality. But this idea is variously manifest in the hegemony of the Hebraic community, the Greek Polis, and, of course, the Roman Catholic church. The Gregorian chant is musically

expressive of that transcendentalist idea: many individual voices sing, but only the voice of 'one' is heard. In this world view, the individual is ontologically derivative. The whole is real, the part is a fiction; thus the part is primarily dependent on the whole for its 'being' and so is primarily a part of the whole. The fictional status of the individual in this paradigm refers to the principle that an original separability of the individual is impossible.

The rise of modernity was the occasion for an ontologically conflicting conception of the individual. The concept of individualism summarily captures that complex idea. In my judgement, a major clue to the cultural theory crystallizing this ontology into a collective representation was the scientific revolution; in particular its new conception of method and its new conception of the nature of Nature. Science shifted the ideal of epistemological authority from the mystery of authority (faith, belief, revelation, intuition) to the mastery of authorship (the rationality of theory and research). In the surrounding revolutions of Protestantism, social contract theory, and industrialization, the same basic idea of the primacy of the individual was becoming established (Baumer, 1977; Berger, 1979:1-29; Berman, 1970; Dumont, 1986:23-112; Kumar, 1978; Lukes, 1973:45-122; Morris, 1972; Stark, 1963; Zijderveld, 1971). Here, because of space limitations, I must focus on the epistemological and ontological revolutions in science.

The change in ontology from supernaturalism (the supernatural explains nature) to naturalism (Nature explains nature) was profoundly important. By the early nineteenth century when LaPlace informed Napoleon that science had no need of the hypothesis of God, the secularization of science was effectively in place and naturalism was its sovereign notion of reality. More and more, that sovereignty began to take hold in the everyday world of common sense. Mary Shelley's *Frankenstein*, the modern Prometheus, is telling testimony to the monumental import of the sovereignty of science and its principle of naturalism.

Science was demonstrating the principle that nature explains itself, with the ideas of system, machine, and determinism. Descartes resort to mind-body dualism with the correlative co-ordinates of inside-outside, and Kant's resort to the transcendental ego and its grounding in the noumenal realm of creation and construction, were, above all else, cultural-ideological responses to the newly emerging issue of freedom and determinism. Their response bears directly on the problem of the disembodied actor. To see this clearly, the sociological import of the scientific revolution for the rise of individualism must be examined briefly.

The mechanistic-nominalist conception of the individual is the bedrock of individualism. Now that this nature is conceived predominately as a deterministic system of causal laws the formal understanding of whole-part changes radically. The 'one' is now dissolved in the 'many': the part is real, the whole is a fiction. The fictionality of the whole refers to the principle that structures are reduced to aggregates of parts. The part is primarily independent of the whole and thus is primarily apart from the whole. The direct consequence of this is a new ontology for the idea of the individual: from the previous principles of organic derivation and differentiation we move to the principles of mechanical origination and separation. In other words, the individual is by nature originally separate from other individuals and its nature is originally individual, and as such a natural given. The formation of various natural wholes now conceived as aggregates is a mechanical event, as is the fundamental nature of the interaction of the naturally given individual's defining aggregates. The diurnal importance of all this is poignantly revealed in Albert Camus' The Stranger, in which Meursault rails against the pure abstract nature of "society", and proceeds to reduce its reference to ordinary individual human beings. The sociological import of the these new principles of origination and separation is manifest in the idea of the mastery of authorship.

What was crystallizing here was the principle and the policy that the authority of God and the collective in matters of truth, reality, and meaning, was being transposed in toto to the authority of the individual and mind. The mastery of authorship confers upon that authorship the virtual authority of God. Mary Shelley understood exactly that. In becoming a doctor of science Frankenstein became the creator of a human creature; however, his moral irresponsibility to his creature in partnership with the creature transformed it into a human monster. With this understanding we can suggest that modern individualism is a possessive individualism. It entails the absolute right of possession and dispossession regarding the agency and authorship of oneself, mind, and body, under the auspices of individualistic advantage.

Cartesian dualism and Kantian transcendentalism must now be seen in the context of the modernity of possessive individualism. To ideologically legitimate the absolute authority of the individual qua individual, Descartes formulated a philosophical theory of that authority in its phenomenological form, "I think therefore I am." He created the reality of individualism by the rational and charismatically legitimated device of definitional fiat,

establishing the principle that the mind is a separate reality, a mental substance, and its separateness is manifest in its location internal to the individual and internal to itself apart from the body.

Hume precipitated a crisis when he used a puritanical reading of empiricism apparently to destroy the reality of the new individualism of the self (the 'I') as the ground for the mind ('think'). That is, if introspectional perception does not identify the self, then it does not exist (after all, as the new slogan in the making was to declare, 'seeing is believing'). Kant responded to Hume's empiricist dogma that only the visible is real (observation as both inspection and introspection) with the rationalist dogma that the apparent reality of the visible is strictly due to the genuine reality of the invisible. This dogma is based on a theory of interaction between the individual as subject and the world as an object and the partnership of individual and world in the construction of that world by the individual.

In all of this philosophical activity the theoretical foundations of the cultural ideology of possessive individualism were being thrashed out. It is particularly clear that the 'mind' and its ground in the 'self' is the exclusive and prepotent ontological concern. The implication is that the body and its movement is taken to be an ontological given, considered unproblematic, and regarded as being defined strictly within the phenomenal realm of mechanism and determinism. The self and mind are exclusively identified within the noumenal realm of spirit and freedom. Everything of value that is human -- for instance, individuality, authorship, and agency -- has essentially nothing to do with the phenomenal world of visible physical objects.

The positivistic construal of Darwinian evolutionary theory enriched this picture by complicating the deterministic system of the human body. Its determinism is extended to include the dynamics of evolutionary time, and the dynamics of an organic energy-drive system (Freud is the paradigm example). As a consequence, a fundamental conflict is established with regard to mind and body at the very core of the idea of modern individualism. The mind of the individual is exclusively the real location of the agency and authorship of the self; the body of the individual is exclusively the real location of causation and movement.

This conflict is of great importance. Since the mind is the natural site of agency and authorship and the body is the natural site of causation and movement, to assign causation to the mind and agency to the body would be to

commit a category mistake of foundational proportions. Freud and Merleau-Ponty of course do just that. In Freud's case the idea is something like this: there must be meaning to an individual's acts since there is more to mind than the conscious. Thus there must be an unconscious causal process generating the meaning of conscious acts of apparent agency: determinism explains (away) freedom. In Merleau-Ponty's case a parallel idea emerges: there must be meaning to an individual's act since there is more to generating meaning than the mind. Therefore, there must be an amental bodily process that is the agency and not the causation of meaning: freedom triumphs over determinism.

It is clear why Merleau-Ponty rejected Freud's concept of the unconscious and translated it instead into the concept of the ambiguity of perception (Merleau-Ponty, 1964b:224-43). He hoped the sting of determinism would be neutralized thereby. However, in the decade of Merleau-Ponty's death (1960's) his translation was unconvincing to psychoanalysts and was dismissed (Descombes, 1980:69-70). This correctly revealed the superficiality of his notion of the ambiguity of perception. The deeper issue of the failure, however, was determinism and the problem of the relationship between causation and agency in reference to freedom. Both Merleau-Ponty and the psychoanalysts did not deal with that issue because they could not. They lacked the appropriate new realist philosophy of science that was in the making in the very same decade.

This, then, is the legacy of Cartesian dualism that is the inheritance of the behavioral sciences. A metaphysical conflict between our categories of mind and body exists. Human traits are assigned to mind and natural traits to body. These categories, defined by rules that we dogmatically prescribe, create deep metaphysical confusion. Our acceptance of these categories as performative resources for the social construction of our mutual identities and value creates the reality of being disembodied in our individuality and being disembodied actors as we live our social lives. When psychoanalysis attempts to resolve our confusion and to reconstruct our reality, it does so by committing the category mistake of dissolving the human in the natural: determinism is the reality behind the appearance of freedom. Ultimately, for Freud, biology is the reality behind culture. This is the deep error of a positivistically informed depth psychology of the individual (Varela, forthcoming). Classical behaviorism merely renders Freud's mistake with puritanic efficiency by translating mind into the strict complement of biological structure, the function of physical behavior. It is in this regard that we can appreciate the wit who, in noticing the connected achievements of both of these psychologies remarked that

psychoanalysis or behaviorism is such a perversion that only a very brilliant fellow could have thought it up.

The perversion is the absurdity of believing that the mind unconsciously generates meaning that appears in consciousness apart from the agency of the person whose consciousness it is. Behaviorism, on the other hand, would have us believe that the body moves by causing itself to behave apart from the person whose body it is. In this combined psychoanalytic and behaviorist misadventure we have the disinheritance of the mind (the person doesn't think, the mind does) and the disinheritance of the body (the person doesn't move, the body does). If one prefers psychoanalysis, the mind thinks and moves for the body by doing both behind the person. If one prefers behaviorism, the body moves and thinks for the person by doing both independently of the person (underneath?).

It is quite clear that neither Cartesian dualism nor psychoanalytic and behavioristic responses to it are acceptable. When we eventually understood that positivism is a misconception of science and that neither of the two psychologies are, or could be, natural sciences, even apart from their positivist commitments, then the unacceptability became decisive. In having eliminated these responses to Cartesian dualism, however, we are still left with its legacy. Although Freud-free and Skinner-free zones for social-psychological analyses of cultural life have been erected, sociology and anthropology continue to honor that legacy, ensuring that disembodied being and action are the order of the day via the endemic 'body-dead/ brain-dead axiom' mentioned earlier.

But let us return to the Merleau-Pontian philosophical response to Cartesian dualism in the wake of psychoanalysis and behaviorism. Earlier, I indicated that the response is essentially a reversal of the center of privilege in Cartesian dualism, although that reversal is conceptually unstable because of the resort to a Heideggerian construal that mind and body are centered in being-in-the-world. In that understandable but unsatisfactory response, Merleau-Ponty's contribution has to be seen as sensitizing, not definitive, and therefore a position that is transitional and not final. Bodily intentionality, the agency of the body, in being taken by Merleau-Ponty to be an "ultimate fact" indicates the infertility of his resort to the idea of being-in-the-world.

The import of this situation is that we should pursue the contrary understanding that people intend, not bodies; and minds don't intend, people do. 'People' here, refers to the concept of the individual not merely as a subject, but

as a person, and therefore an agent. It also refers to 'person' as a social actor causally empowered to engage in social and reflexive commentary with the resources of vocal and gestural (i.e., movement based) semiotic systems. The crux of the matter is that Merleau-Pontian existential phenomenology constitutively lacks a genuine concept of person and agency and lacks any concept of the social nature of the person as agent. My firm thesis is that Harré's work allows us to clarify this dual failing without sacrificing Merleau-Ponty's brilliant shift to the philosophy of history in which he invites us to somehow connect language and gesture. Indeed the clarification explains why the concept of the signifying act provides the connecting link between language and gesture.

Sheets-Johnstone and the Manifestation of Bodily-Logos in Improvisational Dancing

Almost three decades ago Maxine Sheets-Johnstone published what was probably the first philosophical study of the dance (Sheets 1966). From that ground-breaking work she eventually published a paper, "Thinking in Movement," devoted to the philosophical investigation of improvisational dancing (Sheets-Johnstone, 1981). A former dancer turned professional philosopher, her stance is existential and phenomenological, Sartre and Merleau-Ponty being the principle sources that inform her approach to the dance. The ideas of freedom and the 'lived-body' are the central categories with which she launches her investigations. That paper on improvisational dancing shall be the major focus of my examination here, but it is important to note that Sheets-Johnstone has developed her position in a new direction since then, by moving into biology and evolutionary theory en route to formulating her conception of a philosophical anthropology. The culmination of this work is a new book, The Roots of Thinking (1990).

These new ideas were first articulated in a paper (initially an invited lecture) published in the Journal for the Anthropological Study of Human Movement in 1983, two years after "Thinking in Movement." The focus of this new direction is a concern "with evolutionary continuities and existential realities" (1983:132). The theme she is pursuing is "the possible conjunction of human evolution and human freedom through the body" read as "an animated text" (ibid., 130-131). In this reading there is "a grasping of the primordial strata of meaning in the body of human knowledge about the human body" (ibid., 132)." The key idea throughout is that of "viewing the [human body] as a locus of meanings and continuities" (ibid., 130) and seeking to achieve phenomenologically "an illumination of what is there in experience [of the body] and . . . an illumination of the

invariant principles engendered in the experience [of the body]" (ibid.,132).

"Thinking in Movement" is rooted in mixed purposes. The central purpose is to present an account of improvisational dancing --not an improvised dance but the improvised dance. The intent is to differentiate between choreographed and improvised dancing. This distinction identifies her focus: to give an account of one type of dancing, improvisational, and in that account to deal with that genre of the dance itself. The specific intent is to get at the nature of the improvisational process, a process considered to be both creative and generative. Sheets-Johnstone wishes to identify the core of that creative process which generates the dance. This task is set as follows: to get at (1) the essential character (generative core) of, (2) spontaneous creation of, (3) dancing, (4) as experienced by 'a' dancer.

The second point, spontaneous creation, advances toward a precise differentiation between choreographed and improvisational dancing. The creation of improvised dance is deemed to be pure spontaneity: no future, no past, only the instant of birth and thus only here and now. As such an absolute spontaneity, a dance is independent of any relationship to time, or to any other form of dancing. Improvised dancing is meant to be an ongoing or prolonged present of pure instants of spontaneous creation. Although the dance itself is consequently in process without rules according to Sheets-Johnstone, there appears to be at least one rule: the rule of the dance is that there are no rules for the dance.

This feature is not to be taken to mean that we have here a mindless body, a machine in motion without a ghost. Quite the contrary, what we have is a mindful body. It is exactly this thesis that propels Sheets-Johnstone into the consideration of certain traditional philosophical assumptions which she is in fact challenging with this investigation into improvisational dancing. These assumptions stem from Cartesian dualism.

What may well be the major thesis of this paper is the idea of the mindful body, or what Sheets-Johnstone calls "body-logos." What we have here is

. . . that fundamental creativity founded upon the bodily logos, that is, upon a mindful body, a thinking body, a body which opens up into movement, a body, which, in improvisational dance, breaks forth continuously into dance and into this dance, a body which moment by moment fulfills a

kinetic destiny and invests the world with meaning. [ibid.,406]

Thinking in movement is the dynamic logic of fundamental creativity, of which improvisational dancing is allegedly representative. The mindful body in movement is mind literally inhabiting its natural mode of being: mind actually living in movement. This mode of natural being is a declaration of animate existence. In each moment of spontaneous creation of declared animate existence there is the instantaneous unification of sense and motion. An instance of sense and motion is an interfusion such that sense or perception and motion or movement are a homogeneous whole. Thus we have thinking in movement as pure spontaneity and as pure motion.

The critical feature of thinking in movement as pure motion, especially a purity of motion which is a pure spontaneous creation, is its rationality. Its rational character is, of course, kinetic not intellectual, but nevertheless an action of directly "wondering the world". In this action the world is explored and systematically ordered. We almost have here a Wittgensteinian form of life dynamicized: a form of lived movement generated moment by moment is meaningfully lived movement. Generation is creation.

The notion of mindful body or body-logos as pure spontaneity, pure motion, and the creation of a pure form of lived meaning, is admitted by Sheets-Johnstone to be conceptually ambiguous. Her own position is that the cognitive character of body-logos is rational, though she clearly understands that it would be seen by some scholars to be pre-rational, a primitive, not a sophisticated mode of being. This is precisely where the traditional assumptions of Cartesian dualism are implicated. Sheets-Johnstone asserts not only that two of these assumptions determine that the notion of body-logos will be construed as pre-rational be-ing, but that it is just those assumptions which the notion of body-logos directly challenges.

The first assumption entailed by Cartesian dualism is what may be called the human distinction: human thinking is simultaneously rational and linguistic. Our thinking is rational, and that is because it is always conducted within a symbol-system with rules. Thus language is the agency for symbol-making and meaning-making. In that role it mediates thought and determines that movement is the vehicle for thought. This assumption of the human distinction reifies thinking and in so doing, Sheets-Johnstone believes, humankind is being exalted at the expense of denying both that mind may be non-linguistic and still rational, and that

this form of rationality may be in evidence throughout other animal species.

This last point about our shared animal character of non-linguistic rationality is Sheets-Johnstone's peripheral purpose. The account of improvisational dance itself as a creative-generative process and the notion of bodily-logos as the essence of that process ultimately has implications beyond aesthetics. If mind is a fundamental dynamic of kinetic rationality which is non-linguistic (not simply pre-linguistic), we can begin to tie aesthetics, epistemology, and evolution together into a meaningful picture of humankind: we are most human when we are free, and we are most free when we are our fundamental animal self. Apparently, neither communion nor community puts us in more intimate touch with our humanity than our continuity with the animal kingdom.

The second assumption relates to Ryle's version of Cartesianism, the ghost in the machine model of mind: it is in the body but not of the body. Thinking therefore is what a mind does; what a body does is behaving, not thinking. Mind and body relate such that thought is a covert process; that is, it is prior to overt behavior into which it must be transformed. The notion of body-logos is a direct challenge to this mind-doing and body-doing model: thinking in movement refutes the belief that mind is necessarily prior to its overt expression. Thinking of movement and so thinking then movement is one possibility, but a possibility not a necessity. Thinking in movement is movement as thought itself, "significations in the flesh" (1981:400). Movement is therefore mind wondering the world directly and directly making one's way in the world. However, the question can still be raised whether thinking in movement is a moving machine without a ghost, or a ghost in a moving machine?

There is no doubt that Sheets-Johnstone's paper is rooted in the conviction that Cartesian dualism is ultimately overcome by seeing mind as a commonality among species, so that our human distinction is an afterthought so to speak: linguistic rationality comes after non-linguistic rationality. With this conviction we are neither machines nor ghosts, but simply Darwinian animals in movement and so, on occasion, in thought. In time some of us begin to think about the movement in which we have been wondering and making our way. But, the question only persists: even if we are Darwinian animals in movement and sometimes in thought, are we at least ghosts in moving machines? I will proceed to address that question at a meta-theoretical level before proceeding with the critical part of my examination.

If we consider the meta-theoretical developments in modern intellectual attempts to know who we are in the world in which we find ourselves, three meta-theories or paradigms can be identified: supernaturalism, positivistic naturalism, and, quite recently, the twin anti-positivist revolts of new realism and neo-Wittgensteinian naturalism (Keat 1973). For the purposes of this paper I will suspend consideration of the neo-Wittgensteinian revolt. Generally, the rise of science meant a shift from supernaturalism to naturalism: nature was to be assumed to entail both the effects and the causes of all phenomena found in nature (See Figure 1).

SUPERNATURALISM	POSITIVISM	NEW REALISM
Speciality (Creation) - divine selection)	Commonality (natural Selection)	Specificity (natural electivity)
Discontinuity (Spirit: - our spiritual nature)	Continuity (natural status:matter)	Speciation (cultural status:'ascent' to complexity)
Voluntarism (Free will: - our freedom)	Determinism (natural dynamic: physical/biological law)	Determinationism (social dynamic:personal agency)

Some Defining Features of Supernaturalism, Positivism and New Realism

Figure 1

Supernaturalism and its model of man was based on the assumptions of speciality (our divine selection), discontinuity (our divine nature) and voluntarism (our free will). Cartesian dualism was the modern version of this tradition which was to be by-passed by the new paradigm in the making, positivistic naturalism. In fact, what was happening in this development was the inversion of the three former assumptions. From speciality to commonality (our natural selection), from discontinuity to continuity (our natural status), and from voluntarism to determinism (our mechanistic status). In honor of Darwin I will refer to this meta-theory as the 'descent of man perspective'. The birth, establishment, and identity of the behavioral

sciences was and is grounded in that meta-theory. With the gradual demise of the positivist conception of science, signalled by the shift from the early to the late Wittgenstein, we found ourselves in an anti-positivist revolt -- in the philosophy of science particularly. By the nineteen-seventies we found ourselves in a post-positivist age. In honor of both Jacob Bronowski and Rom Harré I will refer to the new paradigm as the 'ascent of man perspective'. While the new conception of rationality and science is not as yet fully articulated, its outline assumptions can be identified. I shall refer to this paradigm as 'existential naturalism' (Bronowski) or 'new realist naturalism' (Harré).

Although naturalism has been accepted, some refinements have been made. The original idea of continuity as a revolt against supernaturalism is still in force. However, we must now distinguish a metaphysical discontinuity between man and nature from a functional discontinuity within nature between species. As Bronowski (Derfer, 1974) has pointed out, evolutionary theory is incomplete if it cannot account for the evolution of complexity, and not simply for the survival of species. This fundamental change in focus, from the survival of species to complexification, signals the ascent of species. This is an ascent to a higher level of a certain kind of complexity and it is of great moment here, for now it can be said that new assumptions are indeed crystallizing. If humankind is not special in virtue of our commonality (because natural selection is the reality of our becoming), then at least humankind is unique. After Bronowski's suggestion concerning our uniqueness, we have, in addition to commonality, the new assumption of specificity. There is a deep change here since the selective natural process now begins to include both the environment and the species as the theoretical site of the selective process. In our case this is the particular entry point for an agentic perspective; that is, if the species is an agent of evolutionary ascent, then agency, especially, is a natural predicate of the activity of individuals. In fact this is itself confirmed by Harré's concept of the power of causal production as the power of agency, as we shall see. Consequently, natural selection within the human realm of evolution becomes a natural electivity.

Quite clearly, then, two other assumptions are emerging here and I propose to call them 'speciation' and 'determinationism'. The evolution of complexity means that functional discontinuity within nature and between species is a required concept and thus a new fact. This is speciation. Since specificity refers to the evolution of complexity, and the natural selective process, in being a

process of ascent, now entails the contribution of the agency of species, determinism must be complemented by the principle of determinationism. Now, when the human species is considered under the auspices of this new paradigm, its assumptions of specificity, speciation, and determinationism permit us to differentiate between the human animal and the human being. The descent of man perspective tells us about an animal who happens to be human, while the ascent of man perspective tells us about a human being who happens to be an animal. If our natural mode of be-ing is human, and that is functionally -- not metaphysically -- discontinuous with respect to other species, then the major clue to who we are is grounded in the unique status of our species self-determination.

I now wish to examine briefly one feature of our unique status in order to clarify the new paradigm called 'new realism' (See Warner, 1990:133). In common with all species we have the requirement of survival, and this, to be sure, certifies our undeniable and most significant continuity with all species. However, we must declare that what is unique to our way of human be-ing is that we do not simply live in order to live, we live in order to mean. We can formulate this thus: human being is cultural, being human is social, and therefore psychological. The conceptual point is that we live from meaning, through meaning, and for meaning. When we socially construct the performative practices of social commentary and reflexivity, especially in the critical mode, we explicitly, and at times ecstatically, are discovering that we exist. To exist is to stand out as a significant difference and so to be above chance. To transcend chance is to function in a critical reflexive mode: to think about, talk, and talk about, and therefore to live self-consciously and meaningfully. Existence differs from survival and profoundly so when the critical mode assumes the role-function of Weberian charismatic leadership, the agency of revolutionary change. Whether it be a Mohammed, Jesus, or a Socrates from the very distant past, or a Ghandi, King, or a Sadat from our very recent past, the critical vision of a new meaning places the charismatic leader in a foundational conflict of mutual exclusivity with the power structure of the culture. Thus, to choose existence is to affirm the new, renounce the old, and, risk extinction; to choose survival is to affirm the old, renounce the new, and risk non-existence. Such leadership is often conducted with full and poignant knowledge that, beyond a certain point, extinction is inevitable.

With such historical examples we can note the species-specificity that marks the ascent of the cultural being of human animals and the gradual self-definitional process by

which nature and culture are effectively differentiated. At the heart of that difference is the functional and not the metaphysical discontinuity between survival and existence: human beings live, but, in order to do so, they have to mean it or die an ontological death. The ascent of culture is a social transubstantiation into human be-ing.

The intellectual context in which we work today is not transitional: we have been in a post-positivist age for at least two to three decades (Hassan, 1985, and Lash, 1989). I contend that our main business with respect to the philosophy of the behavioral sciences is the formulation, utilization, and development of what Marjorie Grene (1966) and Rom Harré (1990) have separately call the conceptual reformation of our understanding of the human conduct of being and knowing. I submit that today the new realist paradigm is our best rational choice and commitment. The assumptions of specificity, our natural electivity, speciation, our ascent into culture, and determinationism -- our authorial living of meaning -- all indicate the living form of being human.

It is with respect to the post-positivist age in which we live and the new realist paradigm that is being articulated with some success, that I can critically engage Sheets-Johnstone's position. It can be clarified by situating it in paradigmatic perspective. It is my contention that the author's use of the conception of body-logos is strictly informed by her commitment to functional continuity and not to functional discontinuity. She defines human being by identifying the unique status of that being with a feature that we apparently share in common with other species: thinking in movement, of which improvisational dancing is supposed to be its cardinal instance. The implicit conception is this: to be human is to be free; to be free is an act of pure spontaneity; and to be spontaneous is to be our fundamental animal self. The mixed purposes of Sheets-Johnstone's paper place her in a mixture of paradigms in which the human animal and the human being are conflated.

In the nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth, it was new, it was exciting, and it was indeed fruitful to attempt a conception of human being as a theoretical derivative of a conception of human animal. The first major phase of the Darwinian revolution rightfully obliged a commitment to that proposition. Specifically, this was a direct result of the continuity assumption and its reductionist program: the simple explains the complex, the earlier the later, the human animal explains the human being, and so on.

What we have learned since is the lesson that it is easy to go back, but, once there, it is extremely difficult to get back to where we are. It now seems quite clear that the reductionist program of continuity is unfruitful: to go back one can never in principle get back. This is directly due to the emergent character of evolution, the logical form of which Bronowski (1970) called an open and unbounded plan. In such a plan an evolutionary solution to the problem of survival is not given in advance but is created in the lived historicity of a species. The reductionist program calls for a conception of evolution as a mechanical process, the logical form of which Bronowski calls a closed and bounded plan. In such a plan a solution to a problem is given in advance. If, then, one intends to achieve a definition of our species-specificity from the assumption of continuity, the description will be given in terms of commonality, but that description will be pointless. The ascent of a species cannot be accounted for by its descent. The logical character of the evolutionary process is prohibitive, in principle. Consequently, if this means, and it does, that the evolution of complexity cannot be predicted and so indeed there will not be commonality between species, but a functional discontinuity, then, of what theoretical value is a description based on the assumption of commonality and prediction.

Since explanation and prediction are separate and different theoretical moments, we must say that there is a deeper point. The description does not coincide with the explanation: the description having to do with descent is irrelevant to an explanation that has only to do with ascent. Explanation and description coincide when both are on the same logical evolutionary level, in this case that of ascent. The point is that to offer a description based on the continuity-commonality assumptions is to describe something as it was, not as it is. And in our case, to offer a decisive description of human freedom in terms identical with animal freedom, whatever that may mean, would indeed be describing us not as we are but as we are no longer. This certainly would be a case of Being and Nothingness, but that is not what Sartre had in mind. Sheets-Johnstone has in effect attempted to account for the early Sartrean notion of freedom as pure spontaneity in evolutionary terms that in fact reduce that notion to spontaneous motion.

Now, admittedly, this may be the fault of both Sartre and Sheets-Johnstone, although I doubt that in the former case. Sartre later set freedom within the cultural context of social life: "It is . . . men who make . . . history on the basis of real, prior conditions . . . otherwise men would be the vehicles of inhuman forces which through them

would govern the social world" (Sartre, 1968:87). Nevertheless, to conceive of the freedom of human being as identical with the freedom of animals to move spontaneously is not of interest descriptively because it is not suitable to our theoretical interest in a different order of natural kinds, human beings. And this is true even if it is what Sartre had in mind, but, of course, his classic battle against Freud's conception of the unconscious was exactly the revolt against positivism -- in particular, the principle of determinism -- of which the unconscious was so notoriously representative. As we shall see, Freud too was conflating the different orders of natural human kinds. Sheets-Johnstone's reading of Sartre here was not in his best theoretical interest, nor ours. For we and Sartre are interested in the existence of human being and the freedom expressive of that elective act. Less than that is what some animals do, human or not, and that is of interest only if one is interested in non-human animals. It may well be that whatever fruitfulness remains in the use of continuity-commonality assumptions is the clarification of the lower from the vantage point of the higher. We may and can clarify animal performance at its best relative to our species in reference to a select biological criterion of interest (a neurological-cognitive criterion in this case). However, we are simply no longer interested in what we can do at their best. Sheets-Johnstone's conception of body-logos is insensitive to that distinction but the insensitivity is meta-theoretical not descriptive. Insofar as she works from the metatheory of positivist naturalism, however uncritically and unintentionally, her descriptive achievement cannot accomplish her descriptive intent to tell us about the freedom of human being. And this is not to say that she commits herself to this paradigm, some of whose assumptions, I contend, she is working from.

An obvious objection can be raised regarding theory and description. Sheets-Johnstone explicitly asserts that she intends to give a description of the (improvisational) dance and not a theory of a dance (improvisational). Granted her precision in attempting to distinguish her task, there is a problem nevertheless. To work from the classic phenomenological claim of the descriptions of things as they are is a claim no longer taken seriously. Such a claim issues from the positivist assumption of the separation of theory and description (or more generally, the separation of conception and perception). The meta-theoretical assumptions of continuity-commonality direct Sheets-Johnstone's descriptive treatment of the dance and lead to two devastating consequences. Her description of human freedom as pure spontaneity in the form of improvised dancing is irrelevant as a description of the freedom of human being. In reference to other animal species it only

tells us of what we can do at their best and what they can do at our poorest. Second, the theoretical intent of her description is irrelevant. If she intends to achieve a conception of human freedom by way of this resort to improvisational dance and evolution, such a conception is impossible because she cannot arrive at a concept of what we do at our best.

This last point raises a fundamental question about her paper. It implicates her in the assumption that improvisational dancing is not what human beings do at our best. And what is meant by "at our best" is two things: what we can do from our unique human powers and capacities, and what we do when those powers and capacities are realized in reference to standards of excellence (in a given local culture). The suspicion is that she made the choice of improvisational dance because in western idioms of dance, improvisation is (frequently) not dancing at our best (but see Puri and Hart-Johnson 1982). My point here is that her meta-theory defined a theoretical interest that is embedded in her descriptive focus. As long as she retains the classic phenomenological posture of the theory-description distinction she will not recognize that her descriptive focus betrays an embedded theoretical interest. The issue is this: her meta-theory compels her towards a theoretical conception of the freedom of the human animal which contradicts her implied theoretical interest in the freedom of the human being. This is my reading of Sheets-Johnstone's relationship to Sartre's work: I am conjecturing that her paper is rooted in the desire to ground his conception of human freedom in human action, on the one hand, and in biological evolution, on the other. Improvisational dance was meant to mediate the two poles of interest.

The absolutely crucial issue, however, is her assumptions about improvisational dancing. Why would anybody assume improvisational dancing is not what we do at our best but what we do at the best of other species? Why would anybody assume thinking in movement is thinking in dancing? And why would anyone assume that spontaneous creation of movement is the spontaneous creation of dancing? Puri and Hart-Johnson clearly demonstrate that unless one knows the rules for structuring a dance idiom, itself imbedded in a local culture, one cannot distinguish between a choreographed and an improvisational dance! And finally, when a dancer uses the word movement, why would anybody assume that the dancer means movement at our poorest and at their best (other animal species)?

The crux of the matter comes to this: Sheets-Johnstone assumes uncritically that improvisational dancing is not

what we do at our best but is the best of other species, and therefore is the poorest of our own. Now, either one is talking about dancing or one is talking about moving, but not both, and in the human realm, neither can be removed from the socio-linguistic sphere of human meaning-making. Spontaneous movement play does indeed occur, as well as spontaneous practical and symbolic actions of all kinds, but improvisational dancing is a dance-act expressive of our best, disciplined by excellence, and is of a different order, as Puri and Hart-Johnson illustrate. It may be emergent, a sort of danced version of a Jackson Pollack action-painting, but if so, in that case what we have is the "the sophistication of extreme simplicity." To create an improvisational dance is to create the appearance of that extreme simplicity, given the sophistication of an artist. There is spontaneity and there is spontaneity: a rose is a rose is a rose is not necessarily the same rose -- it may be a role enacted by Nureyev and Fonteyn.

If indeed it were the case that spontaneous, improvisational dancing solely referred to us at our best when committed to excellence, and art was our intent, then it would seem absurd to claim that such art is rational but pre- or non-linguistic, and so entirely removed from other semiotic systems such as spoken language meaning. Even if one were talking about human movement and not dancing, if its spontaneous generation is claimed to be pre-linguistic, its rationality would be problematic. It would be like calling the body rational because it is ordered; intelligent because it is intelligible. Dancing, improvised or not, compels us to insist that it is necessarily language-like, in the sense that it is part of a semiotic of some kind. The point here is that human word-talking, sign-talking, or enactments of any action-signs, are systematically connected semiotic forms. What is now required is the theoretical imagination to envision the non-vocal languages of the arts. In my judgement, denying this problem of an artistic semiotic is a theoretical failure of nerve. This is exactly what Langer heroically understood and attacked when she developed her thesis about the non-discursive nature of artistic language. Even if her philosophical theory is a failure -- and, alas, I believe it is, a failed solution does not entail a failed theoretical problem.

From my remarks thus far I have to declare that Sheets-Johnstone is in fact talking about improvised human movement play while her intent is to talk about improvised dancing. Even if we grant that spontaneous, improvised movement is created, the status of her category remains in force. It is not the cognitive status nor the creativity of the activity in question which determines its descriptive status, but rather the order of creativity. Movement as she defines it,

spontaneous or not, is activity at their best and our poorest, and so represents the failure of ascent.

In addition, when talking about a species already ascendent, something new is involved. To be at our best is to exist, but to be at our excellent best is to transcend. To remain at the level of movement may be creative, but to ascend to a complex dance-act is transcendence. Sheets-Johnstone's argument would lead her to deny this and to claim that we are merely exalting ourselves with such talk, as spiritual beings within the old supernaturalistic paradigm (*ibid.*, 400-401). But this misses the point. To exalt ourselves at the expense of acknowledging the Darwinian revolution is one thing. But, to do so from within that revolutionary framework in specific reference to the biologically legitimate distinction between the descent and the ascent perspectives is quite another. For, the act of transcendence in ascending to art, or science, or any one of Cassirer's cultural symbolic forms of knowledge, is exaltation. Human being is existence, human excellence is exaltation, and the process is transcendence.

But who is transcending? Descartes was wrong in his insistence on the mind and not the body. Sheets-Johnstone is wrong in suggesting the mind in the body. Her paper is Cartesianism revisited -- Descartes with a twist. A phenomenal act of faith is required to escape Cartesianism by burying mind in the body and declaring that a body-logos is the phenomenological essence of human being. However unintentional, there is a faith implicated in the positivistic naturalism which residually informs her work. As we have seen, evolutionary theory in the modern synthesis requires an enlargement of its premises if the evolution of complexity is to be accounted for. For, without the kinds of enlargement that Bronowski (1977a, 1977b), Gould (1977:63-69, 251-259, 1985), Mayr (1988:8-23), Delbruck (1986), and Margolis (1984:64-82, especially 72-75), have attempted, neither culture, action, nor the social person can be understood as the human natural phenomena that they are. A deterministic model of evolution cannot do it -- the logic of the plan is wrong. In addition, Popper has shown that indeterminism is not enough: animals could still be envisioned as computers. And that would make each of us, if in motion, a ghost in a moving machine.

No, it is not the mind that moves the body, nor the body that minds itself, but the person acting. It is the person who thinks, moves, and dances, but the person is missing in Sheets-Johnstone's movement, thinking or not. And the person is not lost, it simply cannot be found in any non-human animal's "thinking in movement". Descriptions made from the positivistic assumptions of continuity-

commonality dictate a conception of animals as moving machines, and the human animal as a ghost in the moving machine. The person is lost, and only a person dances or improvises, choreographs or theorizes.

A person who dances and/or theorizes does so in terms of a semiotic from a local culture. The ultimate and devastating failure of this phenomenological approach to movement, especially when compounded by being residually embedded in a reductionist program, is that the historical and cultural ontology of the human being is lost to the evolutionary and species ontology of the human animal. This means that the primary social reality of personal agency -- the signifying act and the construction of meaning -- is lost. Sheets-Johnstone's focus on improvisational dancing and her paradigmatic commitments, intentional and unintentional, place her in the classic modernist stance of individualism and the solo-act of being and meaning. This is not only no longer "the way we think now" (Geertz, 1983), it is no longer the way anyone should think about being human any more.

Cartesianism and the Loss of the Person

Sheets-Johnstone's "Thinking in Movement" has taught us that the problem of Cartesianism has not been properly confronted and dealt with. The problem of mind and body and their relationship is not quite the issue. The problem, rather, is that of the missing person in the Cartesian perspective. In this regard Cartesianism constitutes two kinds of errors. One of them is the notorious misreading of the quite proper inwardness of mental life as the fantasy of interiority -- the theatre of the mind (Toulmin, 1979). Thus in reference to the error of interiority, we have the foundational inside/outside dualism, the non-material world of an inner mind versus the outside material world including other people. The derivative of this is the mind/body dualism -- the separation of the interior mind of the individual from his/her own material body. The theatre of the mind metaphor generates a root absurdity: the individual speaks what the mind is thinking. This separation of language and mind implicitly privileges the individual without the crucial notion of person. The focus now is the mind, not language; and the individual as the subject, not the person. And it is clear why: Cartesianism is the intellectual formulation of the new ideology of modern individualism. The theme of the ideology is the conceptual legitimation of the absolutism of the individual in matters of meaning, reality, and truth. The transference of such authoritative matters from the collective to the individual (subject) meant the denial of the 'other' (object), generalized or singular. The human being is now to be

identified with the location of epistemological authority, and that is the mind and the individual, not language and the person (necessarily entailing other persons). This intellectual method of legitimating individualism is, viewed from the way we think now, to be seen as a performative procedure for the political control of the other, favoring the self in matters of the construction of meaning. Modern individualism is the political declaration of the hegemony of the self against the other in social action. It is my firm judgement that this is an important contribution to the social construction of Cartesian dualism.

The other error implicated in mind-body dualism is an equally pernicious, but as yet a far less emphasized mistake, namely, that of confusing the body with the organism. The human organism is an asocial, complex, biological entity, while the human body is a social, complex, cultural entity. The human organism can be regarded as the natural individual and the human body as the cultural person (the rationale for this will be presented later). The mistake of confusing body with organism generates a special kind of root absurdity. This can be seen in the way the two errors are linked.

By disconnecting mind and language, the Cartesian fallacy of interiorization has in fact led to a peculiar dissolution of mind-body dualism. The notion of thinking 'behind' speaking ultimately turns 'mind' into a mentalized organism. Freud gave us one version of this: the structural unconscious (superego, ego, id) is a veritable semantico-lingual engine. Lévi-Strauss gave us another version stressing the logical category as against the Freudian stressing of the affective category (Rossi, 1974:19). The result of the linkage of these Cartesian errors is another indication of the loss of the person: an individual speaking his mind (inwardness: person.) is lost to the individual speaking for his mind (interiority: subject). The human being is now the 'individual' and not the 'person': interiorization shifted the focus from a 'person to person' relation to a mind and self relation (the mind and itself). The mind is now the subject within the body and the other is an object. The absolute priority and centrality of epistemological authority in its transference to individualized location required this separation from the other and this conversion of the other into an object (the objectivist stance). These were the new phenomenological details that were the fulfillment of the prescription of the hegemony of the self over against the other.

It is important to emphasize again that the 'subject' is now the subject of predication, i.e. of experience, of mentality, etc., and is not the person engaged with other

persons in the moral space of a local culture. Ideally the subject of predication is an open category admitting n-number of construals. But since Cartesianism is the theoretical fulfillment of the ideology of individualism, those construals are exclusively restricted to the predicates of 'mind', 'body', and their cognates. Merleau-Ponty's rejection of mind-body dualism avoided both the Freudian and the Lévi-Straussian versions of an unconscious mentalized organism by centering mind and body in the Heideggerian concept of being-in-the-world (Spurling, 1977:14-16, 21-22 and Descombes, 1980:74). But Merleau-Ponty never came to, although he came up to, who that being-in-the-world is, other than the subject of experience (phenomenology) and embodiment (phenomenological existentialism). From the Husserlian consciousness of the world (intentionality) he shifted to a consciousness in the world (bodily-intentionality):

The relationship of subject and object is no longer the cognitive relationship in which the object always appears as constructed by the subject, but a relationship through which . . . the subject is his body, his world, his situation, and in a certain sense enters into interaction with it (Merleau-Ponty 1964a:72).

The last sentence, with its string of possessives beginning with the body and ending with the situation and its implied world of others, is certainly an apparent relief from the where-on-earth--is-it land of Heidegger's being-in-the-world! Merleau-Ponty's concept of the ambiguity of perception, that accompanied his Heideggerian move was the means by which he avoided a Freudian unconscious. But, frankly, the relief from Freud's Cartesian darkness -- the hidden subject -- to the open side of the subject -- its body -- is only a subtle shift to another part of the region of the ambiguity of perception. Merleau-Ponty's move from Husserl's privileging of perception, through Freud's work, and onto Heidegger, was a fruitful move from the interiority of mental life to its inwardness. This characterization is one way to define Hamlyn's suggestion that Merleau-Ponty's notion of the individual is "solipsism with a body" (1989:328). And this is not an inconsiderable achievement. Nevertheless, that "situation" and "world" now includes an ambiguous implication of "other(s)," and is not much more than an unpacking of being-in-the-world. But in this category-set there is no genuine conception of culture, social interaction, and person as summarized in Geertz's paper (1983).

Geertz's valuable paper captures a Kuhnian shift from the individualist model to the culturalist model of human

nature. This allows me to locate further the character of the Merleau-Pontian "terrain of the 'entre deux'", that conceptual space, as Merleau-Ponty himself says, where the Hegelian freedom of "the synthesis of in itself [subject] and for itself [object]" can be found (Descombes, 1980:56). Descombes has described this sense of Merleau-Ponty's project as "an unfinished and precarious one" in which subject and object are neither reconciled nor dissolved, but resolved "between-the-two," a "finite synthesis" of "product/producer, active/passive, instituted/instituting" (ibid., 56-57).

In the individualist model, human nature is biological (as actual or virtual), it is lived psychologically (as interiority or inwardness), and is therefore social and may be experienced as such. In short: if P (psychological) then S (sociological) because of B (biological). At the core of this model is the predisposition to the related ideas of internalized mental structures, the unconscious, and its cognates. Freudian and Lévi-Straussian theories are the old fashioned determinist version (hard and soft respectively), while Jungian theory is a degenerate type, regressing to the mystico-romantic creationism of the charismatic. In the culturalist model the nature of being human is cultural (non-specific biological form of adaptation), it is lived socially (constructed, reproduced, reconstructed) and is therefore psychological and may be experienced as such. In short, if S (social) then P (psychological) because of C (culture) (Bruner, 1990:1-32).

Until their cogency is persuasive, any of the forms of individualist models -- for example, the old-fashioned biological determinism of instinct doctrines or the new-fashioned biological determinisms of either sociobiology or cognitive psychology -- are to be regarded as variations of the fallacy of internalization. This fallacy is based on the twin positivist assumptions of metaphysical materialism and individualism. Its theme: the secret of the social is the psychological, ultimately to be materialized in the organism. As we shall see later, the identification of a fallacy of internalization is Warner's development of Harré's theory of causal powers, as the latter is embedded in the ethogenic standpoint. Harré's standpoint is a social psychological version of the culturalist model. It is a fruitful way to explore fully Urciuoli's suggestions that we move from the speech act to the signifying act, and from the invariant structures of linguistic and other such social theories to the activity of socially constructing, person-empowered, signifying acts.

We can appreciate anew Merleau-Ponty's final position in which the lived-body and its intentionality graduates

into the concept of the gestural body as lived flesh. It can, I contend, be understood as the stretching of the individualist model to its end-point, thus taking it and Merleau-Ponty to the edges of the cultural domain. But in this construal his thought does not, because it cannot, enter into the heart of "the way we think now". Culture, social construction, person and self, and semiotic systems with their signifying acts, are central concepts unavailable to any version of the individualist model. Merleau-Ponty's variety was transitional, sensitizing, and deeply envisioned, but there it remained, 'entre deux'.

As I indicated earlier, Merleau-Ponty's interest in Saussure and philosophy of history meant that he saw the next philosophical frontier to be the nexus of the socio-lingual and the socio-gestural (Descombes, 1980:71-74). This is the other way in which he came up to the cultural world of persons but no further. And it must be made quite clear in this regard that identifying the nexus of language and gesture does not necessarily entail the conceptual grasp of the body as a socially lived cultural entity, the socially lived body in motion, nor this moving body as the person who is its agent. This is not to condemn Merleau-Ponty but simply to indicate sharply how he was neither an anthropologist nor a sociologist in his philosophical thinking. It is also to admire how advanced he was as a philosopher in thinking towards the social. Wittgenstein just before him and Kuhn just after him indicate a watershed in the thinking of philosophers as they discovered the socio-cultural nature of being-in-the-world.

It is of historical importance to note that merely to identify the subject with the body and its flesh, and to capture this as an 'I can' rather than an 'I think', was hardly news, even in Merleau-Ponty's time. The Darwinian field of activity-centered and opportunistically situated animals became the grid presupposed by American pragmatism. Informed by the Emersonian vision of the socially grounded and agentially empowered individual, James, Dewey, and especially Mead, biologized that vision with an emergentist-creativist reading of evolutionary theory. In Mead's first major paper in 1900, the individual qua individual was conceived as a causally empowered personal discoverer, problem-centered and socially situated. It is not mind or behavior that Mead chose as the defining term for his basic proposition that the "unit of existence is the act." It is conduct. And it has two primitive meanings: conduct is movement and conduct is moral (cultural). Thus for Mead the human individual is an embodied (biological) person (causally empowered agent) in social space; and the act is the conduct of movement(s). By 1913 he had completed his celebrated conception of the social nature of mind and self.

With that completion, action as "conducted movement" was refined to "a person's conduct of gesture."

To be sure, Mead was preoccupied with vocal gesture, but it is absolutely clear that he was not restricted to that kind of gesture. First of all, he was particularly preoccupied with his project to defeat Cartesianism by showing that the solipsistic ghost was neither a ghost (because mind is conduct) nor solipsistic (because mind is social conduct). Second, Mead declared that human beings are "endlessly proliferating gestures" (Varela forthcoming a, chapters 7 and 8). In 1913 Miguel de Unamuno near-perfectly articulated the core of the Meadian achievement,

To think is to talk to oneself, and each of us talks to himself because we have to talk to one another . . . Thought is interior language, and interior language originates in outward language. So that reason is properly both social and communal (quoted in Toulmin, 1979:7).

In the spirit of Mead's work then, it must be said that the idea for the signifying act is there. However, what is still missing is the idea of the signifying act. Both Mead and Urciuoli construe the signifying act to include gesture, but of course it is a person's gesture. What is emerging here is a deep challenge to Merleau-Ponty's position concerning the best reading of 'I can'. Mead's work compels us to declare that it is the primacy of the person and not the primacy of perception that is critical. Being-in-the-world is thus the being of a person in the social act of performing culturally-grounded spoken language and other semiotic systems. From that standpoint one can bridge the apparent gap separating language and gesture. Language and other semiotic systems are centered in the conduct of gestures, structured by appropriate rules for their signifying uses. And it is precisely the person who is the missing link in the connection to be made between language and gesture. For it is the person as the social actor in the local culture who has become knowledgable and in some cases literate in its semiotics; and who is enabled to display the cultural ways in which gestural acts can and are significantly performed.

Strawson and the Restoration of the Person

Virtually on the eve of Merleau-Ponty's death, in 1959, Sir Peter Strawson published his important book, Individuals. It is of fundamental importance for this essay because in it he achieved a metaphysically rigorous conception of the human person. He demonstrates that the concept is a major solution to the problem of Cartesian

dualism. The logic of the solution is this: the concept of person is logically primitive in the working of our language, and, in so being, it dissolves the features of interiority and individuality which have marked and marred Descartes philosophy of mind and body. Strawson has shown that the person is lost in Cartesian dualism, and its restoration is realized by understanding that Cartesianism, against itself, in fact presupposes the person (1959:101-103). Thus being-in-the-world is being a person in a linguistic world of other persons. As Langford has recently said in his refinement of Strawson's idea, persons are necessarily social (1978:280-282). And linguistic conduct is a person involved in the act of the ascription of mind and body predicates. But such an act is the ascription of predicates to self and other. Strawson remarks simply on the matter:

". . . in pain" means the same whether one says "I am in pain" or "he is in pain" . . . [it is the same for] first-person meaning, and second and third-person meaning (Strawson 1959:99).

And each lingual partner always presumes that the 'other' is a self-ascriber (Strawson, 1959: 103-108). Person, not perception, is primary; and the person acting is the point of the act rather than bodily or mental intentionality. That one is intentional is given in the primacy of the person. People intend, not bodies. Minds don't intend, people do. Such people as persons -- not as minds or as bodies -- conduct linguistic and other semiotic practices of predicate-ascriptions. Merleau-Ponty referred to the lived-body as "the sentinel standing silently at the command of my words and acts" (Hall, 1983:344). Quite so: his linguistic predicative act commands both body and mind ascriptions. When one takes that linguistic act as a given, attention to be-ing is now available, mental and physical, or whatever. The experience of the body can be electively attended to. Thus talk about the body, that is with the third-person pronoun and its objectivist rhetoric, shifts to talk of the body, that is first-person pronoun and its subjectivist rhetoric. Merleau-Ponty's discourse on the lived-body is talk of the body from the first person subjectivist standpoint. But what the discourse cannot permit one to engage in is talk from the body in the terms of a non-vocal semiotic. Several authors working in the anthropology of human movement systems do exactly that (see Farnell in press).

Thus the Merleau-Pontian standpoint permits us to hear people talk when they are speaking, but not to understand (not guess or believe) that they may still be "talking" when they are not speaking. As one example only, a group of

Plains Indian sign-talkers sitting around and not speaking for some time, but periodically laughing uproariously, is beyond the existential phenomenological position, in principle. And any degenerate form of existential phenomenology, either the strong version of Sheets-Johnstone or the mild version of Jackson, both repeat and demonstrate that conceptual impotence. Both may talk of the body and thus avoid the intellectualist limitation, but talking of the body and doing so in subjective-experientialist terms, is not talking from the body in the conduct of a non-vocal, semiotic, gestural system. And fatally, by rejecting literacy in principle as intellectualist (despite their own literate practices) means that movement literacy, being outside of the common spoken or written variety, cannot even be imagined. Even when observed in the practices of others, it simply cannot be taken seriously. Becoming literate by learning Labanotation, for example, is an impossible prospect. Consequently, word-glosses, the translation and reduction of actions into spoken language terms, will absolutely and automatically be provided instead of movement scores, as if by some mysterious necessity.

Now it is my contention that the key to this systematic failure, at least from a conceptual point of view, is the systematic loss of the person in the primacy of perception (see also Grene, 1985). The key to being able to graduate from talk of the experienced body to talk from the enacted body, is a grasp of the principle that the person must be primary in our conceptual understanding. Being-in-the-world is the being of a person in a cultural world of socially constituted linguistic and other semiotic conduct. Today 'conduct' has become 'practices'.

The Primacy of the Person and the Primacy of Causation

The next step in the argument is to connect the primacy of the person with the primacy of causation. The point here is that 'person' presupposes the agency to author the linguistic practices of predicate ascriptions of all varieties. In order to have a genuine conception of person as possessing the agency to author, the conception must be connected to the ideas of substance and causal power. For, without these, 'agency' becomes a free-floating occult quality sustained only by an act of faith; that is, as feeling, experience, or simply getting on with living (not thinking philosophically). The deep problem of Cartesian dualism is the failure to ground agency ultimately in anything but an act of faith. To believe that intentionality indexes agency because it is mental has of course failed: this is the point of 'the ghost in the machine' metaphor. But to then believe that agency is saved because it is identified with the body (thus a body-logos)

is equally a failure. Without causation, the 'force' of intention is a ghost, regardless of its mental or bodily identity.

As long as causation is only associated with deterministic causality, agency is contradicted by causation. In this case causation cannot be conceptually available as the foundation of agency. And without 'cause' there is no 'force', and consequently there can be no agency. Thus the traditional Cartesian version of agency is the ghost and the machine; the Merleau-Pontian version of Cartesianism is the ghost in the machine. In either case, agency as intentionality is a ghost. To believe that the body can be the house of freedom through the trick of calling it the 'lived-body', is merely chimerical. The actuality of the body, as physical or experienced, by itself, does not and cannot establish the reality of agency. The Harréan view is that the reality of agency is the reality of natural kinds of particulars, substances, having the power (potential, i.e., latent force) to produce consequences (force i.e. actual power) (Harré and Maddon, 1975:82-100 and Harré, 1986b:281-316). The concept of person is one kind of substance naturally endowed with the power to produce consequences. It is in this exact sense that the next step in the argument is to connect the primacy of the person with the primacy of causation. In that connection agency is real because it is grounded in the reality of the causal powers of substantial things. The philosophy of science that has made this kind of critical understanding possible is new realism.

Naturalism and the New Realist Revolt Against Positivism

During the nineteen-sixties, the decade of Merleau-Ponty's death, a conceptual reform was crystallizing in the philosophy of science. Its theme was a revolt against the positivist conception of science (Keat, 1973:3-16). In the following decade the import of the achievement was clear: every major assumption constituting that conception of science was overturned. It is now necessary to draw a distinction between actual scientific practices and philosophers' (in this case positivist) normative speculations about those practices. A direct consequence of this is that we are no longer to conflate naturalism and positivism. On the one hand, naturalism refers to the scientific revolt against supernaturalism, that is, nature explains itself. On the other hand, naturalism refers to the practices of scientific rationality in its endeavor to explain nature in its own terms. As Keat has shown, there are two complementary construals of scientific practice, namely, neo-Wittgensteinian (Kuhn, Hanson, Toulmin, et al.) and new realist (Bohm, Bunge, Harré, et al., (ibid., 6-9).

The direct implication for the behavioral sciences is that there is The Possibility of Naturalism (Bhaskar, 1979 and Margolis, 1984). Thus the study of people can be scientific in the same way but not in the same sense as in the natural sciences. Consequently, experimentation with its strict demands within closed conditions, complete manipulatory control, and a mechanistic conception of causation, is impossible in principle and a perversion of the condition of human being. This is so because, first of all, it is rooted in the fallacy of individualism which eliminates the cultural reality of human being. Secondly, it is rooted in the fallacy of determinism, the elimination of the agentic reality of human action that reduces action to behavior. The fruitful result of this breakthrough beyond individualism and determinism is the freedom to develop methods of explanation and research condign to the natural condition of being human.

Positivism, of course, has been the source of both these fallacies, which fact allows us to understand anew the witticism referred to earlier concerning the perversion of Behaviorism and Psychoanalysis. The deeper point is the perversity of a positivist reading of being human. And for some time now it has been quite clear that only the very mediocre and/or ambitious can keep up the positivist reading in the behavioral sciences.

However, there is another side to this issue of positivism and the anti-positivist revolt. Some behavioral scientists remain ignorant (deliberately or otherwise) of the new realist version of this revolt, particularly. They still conflate naturalism with positivism. This is a mediocrity and/or an ambitiousness of a different sort. For instance, it invites one to become anti-scientific and thus to indulge in some sophomoric form of mystico-romantic psychologism, sociologism, and anthropologism. It can be said that the flight into phenomenology and into existentialism has functioned in some cases as a cover and cover story for those so engaged. Whatever the nature of the rejection of naturalism, however, to continue that rejection is a serious intellectual fault. Failure to comprehend the fundamental fruitfulness of new realism risks failing to solve fundamental problems besetting the behavioral sciences, such as the 'body-dead/brain-dead' axiom in the behavioral sciences that is the focus here.

New Realism and the Fallacies of Determinism and Individualism

Harré's unique contribution to the demise of positivist hegemony can be presented as a coordination of two insights; one concerning science, the other concerning behavioral

science. Harré is rigorously impassioned to preserve the conceptual integrity of scientific rationality and the relevance of that rationality for the possibility of naturalism in the behavioral sciences (Harré, 1986a:ch.1). We must be very clear about this: the "possibility" refers to naturalism and not to natural science.

For the sake of absolute clarity I will offer a formulation of a deep principle of Harré's on these matters. In so far as the conceptual integrity of scientific rationality is preserved the possibility of naturalism in studying people is a real possibility. A new realist science of people means the study of human beings qua human beings, that is as people in their cultural life of 'person to person' semiotic actions (Harré, 1984:3-112). In this way scientific study is appreciative and not depreciative of the humanity of being human. Positivist behavioral science is obviously depreciative of the humanity of being human. In the root reduction of culture to the individual, explanatory efforts entailed the reduction of action to behavior and/or some variation of unconscious mental/neural structures. Given the appreciative attitude of a new realist study of people, such a science is genuinely a social or cultural science, or more precisely, a social psychology.

Harré's ethogenic standpoint is one version of a new realist science. At present, it can be represented most concisely in the form of three doctrines (Harré, 1983:68, and Mühlhäusler and Harré, 1990:1-40, 87-130).

1) Sociological Doctrine

Two orders of society are posited: the expressive and the practical. The expressive order refers to the dimensions of honor, reputation, worth, and so forth; the practical order refers to work with material things and resources of biological knowledge. The explanatory principle unifying these orders is what Harré has called Goffman's law: the expressive order tends to dominate the practical order. The expressive order can be understood as grounded in the existential realm of cultural life, that is the realm of meaning, socially constructed for ordered/coordinated living. The practical order is simply the realm of survival, that is the interface of culture and the natural world.

2) Psychological Doctrine

Former notions of social structure are translated into structures of social action. This strategy blocks traditional theoretical dispositions to reify social

structure deterministically. The agency/authorship of the structures of social actions is identified with the actors, particularly their intentions and beliefs. The location of actors intentions and beliefs is collective, less so are they individually located. The explanatory idea is that access to these agentic features of persons is given in the study of the actor's accounts. The centrality of social action, personal agency, and collective localization indicate the social construction strategy in the ethogenic standpoint.

3) Social Psychological Doctrine

The social construction of mind is derived from the linguistic practices of the local culture. The explanatory idea is in a distinction between the twin identities of person (L-identity) and self (A-identity). The local culture is lived by embodied and indexically located interactors arrayed throughout conversational vocal space (and, we would want to add, non-vocal space -- this is the spirit of Williams' action sign. These actors are the real entities (natural kinds: substance-powers) of social life to which the term 'person' exclusively applies. Persons (interactors or social actors) are the source models for cultural myths or beliefs defining a subject of predication for the agentic and authorial centering of experience. Ideally, centering functions to organize thinking, acting, and memory so that agency crystallizes into the responsible authorship of mind and conduct. The subject of centering is the self. While the person is a real indexical entity, the self is a performative referential resource that is used to construct personal identity. The constructional activity is conducted through the auspices of social conversational practices (Mühlhäusler and Harré, 1990:88-104;114-122).

That the power of the social constructional strategy is vigorously exploited from the Harréan standpoint is indicated in two telling ways (at least to sociologists). Harré has made two fundamental contributions to the development of the Meadian theory of the social nature of mind and self. Uniting the contributions is the introduction of a linguistic turn into Meadian theory. First, Mead's famous "taking the role of the other" is seen as the consequence of learning the linguistic practices of the local culture's pronominal usage -- first, second, and third person. The second and third person standpoints refer to Mead's significant and generalized other, respectively (Harré, 1986b:151-152). Second, Harré has completed the Meadian social theory of mind as an interplay of the components of the self, the 'I' and the 'Me'. 'I', or first person pronoun practices, systematically vary cross-

culturally; thus the 'I' as well as the 'Me' must be socially constructed (Mühlhäusler and Harré, 1990:97-104).

A logical next step in the development of Harré's social construction theory would be the consideration of non-vocal semiotic practices, that is movement systems and not only physical being (Harré, 1991). This would permit Harré not only to give accounts, for instance, of several people moving a piece of furniture together (his own image), but also of Graham dancers forging a new version of Rite of Spring, or a group of Plains Indian sign-talkers laughing uproariously between the silent telling of yarns. Without such a development Harré's linguistic turn must be judged only half of one. Williams' semasiological approach has already taken that step, having been inspired by Harré's causal powers theory of human agency (1982:161-182).

Thus, signifying acts refer to the moving body producing action-signs and constitutes a systematic conception of the genuine agency of embodiment. In Harré's notion of physical being reference is made to the idea of "bodily enactments", but without any clear implication of the genuine agency of embodiment. The significant difference resides squarely in the fact that the action-sign is a systematic derivation of the concept of the semasiological body (Varela forthcoming b)

The Fallacy of Determinism: The Proper Restoration of the Person

The fallacy of determinism entails the loss of causality in the natural sciences and thus the loss of agency in the social sciences. The result is the fundamental loss of the person in the social sciences: the subject as social knower and cultural being disappears. Without causality, agency is impossible. Without agency authorship is impossible. And without authorship being human is impossible. The proposal is that human living is the person-centered authorship of knowing beings in social situations of cultural action. From this perspective we can re-read Durkheim's response to the Hume-Kant controversy. Durkheim's fear was misplaced: Hume's conclusion that there was succession and not necessity in the relationship of cause and effect undermined the Newtonian view of order in nature. Durkheim construed this to mean that the fundamental possibility of science and society was threatened. However, at issue was not the necessity of order but the necessity of causal production. Durkheim's 'social fact' was thus ill-conceived: the fact of social life is not its necessary order and constraint and then human beings living deterministically within it. This feature was due to the residual positivism tucked away in the notion of the social

fact. This has been the lingering problem of the realism of the social fact. The danger of the Humean subversion was the loss of agency and production in the natural sciences and thereby the loss of personhood and authorship in the social sciences. Durkheim failed to understand this and so his mission to rescue Kantianism, science, and sociology for modernity also failed.

Briefly, the fallacy of Humean subversion involves the reduction of causality to correlation. Consequently, causal production is dissolved in relationality (Dewey), function (Cassirer), experience (James), or events (positivism) (see Dewey and Bentley, 1949; Cassirer, 1953; James, 1971; Harré and Madden, 1975). This is why strong and weak forms of empiricism cannot ultimately be genuinely scientific, as in the case of positivism wherein event-description and prediction are conflated with explanation. Certain kinds of empiricism can be ambiguously scientific, as in the case of pragmatism wherein experience or relationality are emphasized without the possibility of explanation. As a significant and relevant example for this essay particularly, insofar as William James unfortunately committed himself to a weak form of empiricism, causality and human agency were conceptually unavailable to his definitional efforts. In James's radical empiricism, the abandonment of substance and causality (albeit inadvertently) for function and experience, was aimed as saving agency by avoiding determinism (James, 1971:4-22). Since at that time positivism meant assimilating causality into determinism, James was correct in his choice, but the choice was unfortunate in its consequences. The category of subject was a moral preference over the category of object embedded in the then supposed otiose conceptual net of laws, substances, and causes. In this context James's radical empiricism is now best understood as a forced choice. He was forced into the absurd choice of affirming both the reality of the particular -- in this case the person and the "stream of consciousness" -- and the denial of its substantiality. What he was left with was a neutral category: the subject and its reality, referenced only by its functioning in a situation of relationships, and its reality warranted only by the feltness of its agency. In short, the feeling of agency was the experience of agency. It is fully understandable why James could announce that, "My first act of free will shall be to believe in free will." He believed in agency, and thus had the feel of and for agency, but he could not conceive of how to formulate it. This weak form of empiricism means, paradoxically, that what was radical about James's empiricism was the radical loss of causality and hence agency.

Scientifically, causality and agency are only conceivable when they are grounded or embodied in substantiality. Without the category of substance there can be no conception of causality as agency; and therefore, there can be no conception of the agency of a person. When person is grounded or embodied in substance, agency is assured, because causality is then in its proper place. In view of this, I contend that Merleau-Ponty's resort to embodiment was not sufficient and is no longer relevant. His position is transitional because his conceptualization, while sensitizing, is not scientifically definitive. This is because the body alone cannot establish the agency of intentionality; causality does. Agency is the causal production of consequences, and substance is required to ground that productive agency. Thus it is the substantive person and not the body that assures agency. Secondly, the point of embodiment is not to save agency from the rationalism that stems from a conception of mind in which causality is the same as determinism. Rather, the point of embodiment must be, initially, to locate causality in its proper place, in the substantiality of our physical thinghood (particularity).

Now this allows us to see that substantiality entails two aspects of thinghood; the organism and the body, and not the mechanical and the lived-body. What will properly differentiate organism and body is not any resort to 'experience', 'feeling', 'lived-body', or finally, 'being-in-the-world'. These are, ultimately in the light of new realism, weasel words. The issue of agency and authorship involves locating the agency of causality in the substantiality of a person. Thus it is not a question of locating agency and authorship in the mind or in the body. As long as naturalism is conflated with positivism and therefore causality and substance are conflated with determinism, we will have lost agency and authorship in 'experience', 'feeling', or the 'lived-body'. Agency must be embodied in substance in order to have the causality that makes for the productive power of consequences. In this conceptual move the concept of person can be properly restored. Strawson's idea that the concept of the person is logically primitive, requires a grounding in a scientific concept of natural kinds of causally empowered substances. New realist philosophy of science satisfies that requirement.

Causal Powers, Substance, and the Body

In the social sciences two of the influential standard accounts of scientific thinking are Cassirer's Substance and Function (1953) and Dewey's and Bentley's Knowing and the Known (1949). With regard to causality, however, both

are seriously misleading. Dewey and Bentley's work can be regarded as a refinement of Cassirer's concepts of substance (philosophy: thing as primary, relation as secondary) and function (science: relation as primary, thing as secondary). These became their concepts of self-actionalism in the case of substance, inter-actionalism as a combination of both substance and function (interaction of pre-given substances), and transactionalism (a field of relationships virtually purified of substances). In their understanding of science the concepts of function and transaction stress the distinctive shift from thing to relationship.

We have here an example of the persistent error of reducing causal relation to correlation and hence the disappearance of power (potential: latent force), force (actual: manifest power), necessity, production, and substance. Harré has made it eminently clear that this standard reading of science is simply wrong. The history of physics, for example, is in fact the triumph of a dynamical theory of matter over both the materialist and the phenomenalist theories (Harré and Madden, 1975:161-175). With that achievement causal powers theory has become the way in which causality is understood in physics.

Central here, is the subtle change in the conception of the 'body'. In the common-sense materialist version, substance is an individual entity (substratum) and its complex of (empirical) qualities: bulk, figure, motion. The rejection of this traditional substance-quality model (Aristotelian: Cassirer's substance) for the phenomenalist alternative (Galileo: Cassirer's function) was radical and devastating. It meant that the idea of substance as a substratum (subject) independent of its qualities (predicates) was replaced with another error, a substance-less and free-floating set of qualities. In both the substance-quality and the substance-less quality models, causality is not available. In the former, cause is an occult phenomenon since it is identified with a substratum mysteriously independent of its qualities. In the latter, it is obvious that without substance there is no ground or embodiment for causality (Harré and Madden, 1975:165-175). Harré's and Madden's comment concerning this predicament is apt:

Of course, 'substance' was not an empirical concept, but that did not require one to reject the basis of the scientific account of nature as rooted in real things responsible for appearances. It required a better conception of what individual things must be (Ibid., 173).

A "better conception" is the dynamical theory of matter in which various forms of matter are not derived

. . . from matters as machines, that is, as mere tools of external moving forces, but from moving forces of attraction and repulsion originally belonging to these matters (ibid., 170).

Note carefully that the dynamical theory conceives of matter as immaterial (non-material: either quality model) and as substances responsible for appearances (the qualities). Thus we have, as Harré declares, matter as a "fields of potential" constituted by "centres of mutual influence." The field of potential locates powers for effecting influence at centers defined as real and immaterial things (ibid., 161,175-183). This formulation is as provocative as it is exact. How can real individuals be immaterial and be responsible?

Traditional and radical empiricism, positivism and pragmatism, respectively, commit the fallacy of actualism, that is the error of identifying reality with perception, experience, and materiality. Implicit in this error is another, that of separating theory and observation as if the latter were a case of immaculate perception. Thus, as Hume would have it; since we cannot 'see' cause as power or force, causation is a subjective fantasy occasioned by the habit and expectation of regularity. But as Harré reminds us, our perceptual apparatus is a biological evolutionary accident. And, we may add, perception entails direct ordering processes as well as all sorts of indirect interpretive sets. Kant of course was right: you cannot separate perception from conception, you will go blind. Moreover, you had better not divorce conception from perception, you will be empty-headed. Hume was absolutely wrong. Harré correctly reminds us that the Michotte experiments on the perception of causality have demonstrated that we do directly perceive causality (Harré and Madden, 1975:60-62). The question of how you interpret the perception of causality is a separate question, and, of course, Hume was also wrong in his interpretation. Harré suggests that since Hume was a historian and not a scientist we should not be surprised.

So, the demand for materiality, I propose, is a covert plea for epistemological narcissism; that is, as modern possessive individualists, we demand that knowledge be our acts of sensation, experience, and perception. Instead, the question of immateriality would suggest a sophisticated and fruitful new realist response to the failure of positivism and the empiricist fallacy of actualism. But, now, what of the question of things being responsible? This goes to the heart and soul of the matter of causation and agency, and thus, to that of person and authorship.

Harré is firm in the argument that the tradition of believing that the scientific conception of causality is the projection of human volition is itself a consequence of assuming that only human volition is the experiential basis for the direct perception of causality. The projection of human volition as the fact of causality can assume one of two forms, individualistic (Whitehead's error of animism and pan-psychism) and collectivistic (the Durkheimian error of the social fact as constraint and coercion). The combined assumptions of volition as causation and the projection of volition represent what Harré calls "the inferential predicament." In order to definitively block the predicament, we must reject the assumptions, and four reasons are given for doing so, only two of which I will single out here (Harré and Madden, 1975:58-62).

First, our best theory is that the idea of causation originates in the observations and experiences of causal actions among things themselves apart from human beings. As mentioned earlier, the Michotte experiments demonstrate that pure mechanical causation is a direct primary perception. Especially, he has shown that the Humean assumptions of the necessity of habit and expectation for the perception of causality are unnecessary! Second, causal powers theory clearly regards the case of human causation as a "subspecies of 'cause' significantly different from the sub-species that includes physical objects and events" (Harré and Madden, 1975:59). In other words, although production is the general form of causality, human agency is a special type.

Now this is certainly to be expected in the context of biological evolution. The development of open and unbounded plans where solutions to adaptive problems creatively succeed those problems, strongly suggests the evolution of new kinds of agentic structures. Relevant to human beings and in reference to neurological criteria, the emergence of instinctive brains, social brains (higher primates), and cultural brains (human beings), strongly supports this special thesis of causal powers. The human brain (organism) is the natural ground of our causal powers. It enables the transubstantiation of causal powers into personal powers by culturally grounding causal powers in acts of social interaction. Social construction is the interactional mechanism transforming our powers from organism to person, and with that, our substantiality from the organism to the body. There are thus two kinds of embodiment here: the natural embodiment of agency in the organism, which makes possible the social embodiment of authorship in the person. Thus, the principle of the primacy of the person, set within the understanding of the reality of causal powers and the

immateriality of substance, leads to the conclusion that the body is the person.

Causal Powers: Logic and Principles

We can now ask, what is this special type of human causal power, and what is the general form it exemplifies? Schematically, it can be characterized as, 'y decided to do z (or does z) and then justified his action by reference to x'. What is rejected by this scheme is, 'x caused y to z'. The absolutely crucial distinction is that in the former scheme, "y refers to a self that initiates causal sequences but is not causally activated itself" (Harré and Madden, 1975:59). The rejection of the standard deterministic 'x caused y' scheme does not mean that it does not obtain for us; after all, we are objects in the natural world as well. It does mean, however, that if human agency is construed only in that way, such a deterministic scheme is inappropriate and otiose. Inappropriate because it is a wholesale substitution eliminating the human type, as if the latter is a fiction. That is simply wrong and arbitrary. My suspicion is that, in part, this uncharitable disposition is an endemic feature of the Cartesian construal of modern individualism. The principle of the hegemony of the self as subject over against the other as object is the point: objectifying 'other' maximizes one's control. The standard deterministic schema is otiose because it is a subversion of the general form of causation given in causal powers theory. It either is, or threatens to be, the denial of the very idea that causation is the power of production. It is now necessary to consider two definitions of causal power from Harré and then Bhaskar:

A Particular Being has a Tendency (disposition: tendencies, powers/forces, propensities) which if released, in a certain type of situation, is manifested in some observable Action but when blocked has no observable effect. Adding the releasing and blocking condition introduces the basic element of agency into the causal story. Further advance (in the story) . . . involves the discovery of the mediating mechanism (of production) and the precise state of the particular being in which the tendency is grounded. (Beyond certain conditions for the ascription of tendencies) . . . Dispositions are ascribed to actual occurrent beings, but, in most contexts, they seem to refer to possible (powers) rather than actual (forces) manifestations of the typical behavior cited in the consequent of the leading conditional clause (Harré, 1986:284).

- 1) X has the power (or liability) to do (or suffer) y.
- 2) X is predisposed towards doing y.
- 3) X will do y, given an appropriate set of circumstances, in virtue of its nature in the absence of intervening (or countervailing) causes.
- 4) X possesses powers in virtue of falling into a natural kind; tendencies in virtue of its being a type within that kind (Bhaskar 1978:229-231).

It should be noted carefully that in causal powers theory we are able systematically to connect agent/patient, action/behavior, (pro)active/reactive, power/liability. Causal activity is a constituted disposition to realize power or liability under appropriate circumstances. We should also note the concepts of release and block. Their implication is that natural things are powerful particulars of various physical and biological kinds. Nature is naturally active, some of it alive. Thus, for instance, the concept of stimulus has been disastrously misunderstood generally in psychology and in behaviorism particularly. When, for example, Skinner switched his terminology from elicited (from Pavlov) to emitted behavior the deterministic meaning of stimulus was retained. In other words, even after admitting the natural activeness of animals, environmental reinforcement took up the deterministic slack. However, in science 'stimulus' means the release or blockage of the power/liability of particulars to produce consequences in a field of other such particulars. This is a radically different view of the empirical world, and thus it is a markedly different conception of empiricism. In being so, it surpasses empiricism in its various positivist, phenomenalist, and pragmatist forms. Experience is possible precisely because of our causally empowered ordering devices in partnership with nature and with each other. The Kantian insight into the constructional nature of being human was certainly penetrating but he also pioneered a profound dynamical philosophy of nature which formulated the basic causal powers theory in science. But the constructional power of human being is emergent within and defined by a cultural, social, and semiotic world. The empiricisms cited above -- the traditional, phenomenalist, and pragmatist -- require to be set firmly within the framework of new realist philosophy of science. In that setting both traditional and phenomenalist varieties of empiricism are dismissed in being overhauled in terms of causal powers theory. In the case of Jamesian experientialism, his recognition of the causal agency of things and his feel of and for human agency can be conceptually clarified and used to ground the emphasis on experience (Harré and Madden, 1975:57-58).

To present two fundamental principles of causal powers theory implicit in the definitions provided, I will examine Harré's treatment of a concrete example of a powerful particular.

The executioner had a good eye, a strong arm, and a sharp axe, and he whacked off the king's head. Swinging the axe in just that way (necessarily) caused the king to lose his head. . . . (This example is one of countless others), the lava flow, the medicine, the light rays. . . . The agency is there, to be sure (in each case). There is no other 'force', there is no other cause, than just these specific things. But these things are forceful: they operate: they produce. And they (do so) . . . in that specific way we call necessary. (Harré and Madden, 1975:57)

Two fundamental principles of far-reaching significance can be identified from these considerations, namely, structural integrity and the fallacy of bifurcation, and causal activity and the fallacy of activation. Harré presents them well:

We must avoid at the outset the reification of an abstract term. The notion of causal power should not be conceived as an undefined descriptive predicate that refers to an ontological tie that binds objects and events together. The exercise of causal power is not a force or power that has an existence of its own but refers to forceful particulars at work. There are not both things and causality in nature but causally active things. This (causal) necessity . . . was no ontological tie behind the events that bind them together. . . . It lay rather in the concrete situation, in the force used to swing the axe, in the sharpness of the axe, the angle of descent, and the contact with a yielding substance. And it always is. The efficacy of casual power is nothing general . . . And it is with the concept of powerful things and integrated structures of things . . . the concept of generative mechanism . . . that we devise an ontological tie . . . for the connection of causes with their effects (Harré and Madden, 1975:57)

The principle of structural integrity is the idea that things, animals, and people, are individuated natural kinds identified by their constituted systemic wholeness. Thus, the power of a particular resides in the natural constitution of its kind: in brief, its structural integrity. The fallacy of bifurcation refers to separating a particular from its cause

outside itself, or a particular and its cause inside itself. In either case, cause is isolated as a reified abstract term (an occult phenomenon), which as an undefined descriptive predicate functions as an ontological tie behind events tying them together.

The principle of causal activity then simply follows from the foregoing principle. If causal power is the force of a particular and not a force and a particular, then causality is the "activity of forceful objects at work." The fallacy of causal activation is clear: there cannot be an outside or inside power of a particular (except of course other powerful particulars) that forcefully activates the particular. The fallacy leads one seriously to ask absurd questions such as, 'Where is the explosion before the dynamite is detonated?'. Marx and Durkheim, Freud and Lévi-Strauss, in effect, asked and answered such a question according to their variations on the theme of collective and/or individual unconscious mental structures. If you believe that mind is located behind a speech act or behind a signifying act, you will look for an explosion before it happens, in and behind that happening.

The Fallacy of Individualism

Terry Warner's concept of the fallacy of internalization is a useful development of causal powers theory (Warner, 1990). Internalization is the idea that the psychological is the secret behind the social, and ultimately some form of biologization of the psychological is to be realized. The strategy required is to read social life back into the people who live it. Thus the fallacy is rooted in the twin positivist assumptions of individualism (reality is individual) and metaphysical materialism (the reality of the individual is material). The strategy is realized by three procedures:

(1) Desocialization: the action of social relationships becomes instead the action of psycho-biological dynamics. For example, Freud took the interrelationships of the moral authority of the local culture, the mental features of its individual members, and an interest in their individuality and systematized them into the complex dynamic of superego (culture), ego (individual), and id (individuality).

(2) Decontextualization: situated meaning is identified and read back into individual mental/neural structure.

(3) Depersonalization: the agentic production of action is relocated in an individual mental/neural process (Warner, 1990: 141-143).

The internalization fallacy, I would suggest, partly originates in the ideology of modern individualism and is generated within the auspices of the positivist conception of science. A positivist reading of individualism is a rendering of the individualist human nature model. The theme, strategy, and procedures that realize the verbal formula of the model if P (psychological) then S (social) because of B (biological) inverts Marx's sixth Feuerbachian thesis that 'the essence of man is no abstraction inhering in each single individual'.

The assumption of metaphysical materialism used in an individualist explanatory schema involves the mistake of conflating body and organism. In the reduction of body to organism, the organism becomes an asocial and complex mentalized system/engine (Warner, 1990: 138-140). The substance of human physical thinghood is displaced and identified with the organism. Embodiment in this context is the body as organism. As a result, the powers of the natural individual organism are conflated with powers of the social individual person. This is the final consequence of the dogma of empiricism and its assumption of metaphysical materialism. The visible (perception, experience, feltness, sensation, sensual surfaces) is rendered absolute in virtue of the principle that the material is real. Under the auspices of this internalization fallacy, person, body, and movement must be regarded as unreal and hence invisible. This is the logic of the 'body-dead/brain-dead' axiom.

For the purposes of this essay it will be sufficient to focus exclusively on the procedure of desocialization. It is based on Warner's inversion of his fundamental idea in the discussion of the internalization fallacy. Warner works from a culturalist model of human being, and he has formulated a special conception of the social nature of being human. The concept is constructed from within the logical space of the experimental design in order to explode the myths of determinism and individualism endemic to a positivist reading of the design. It is not necessary for my discussion here to reconstruct the systematic details of Warner's conception; suffice it to say that, in my judgement, the task of constructing the conception of our social nature and the explosion of the two myths of positivism are both informative and cogent (Warner, 1990:133-137). What I will do is discuss the conception itself as it directly fits my analysis thus far.

Warner has effected what I have elsewhere called the "Simmellian shift" (Varela, 1992). He demonstrates Simmell's point, *fin-de-siècle*, that a Kantian model of social life demands a subject-to-subject format in which mutual social synthesizing among the actors defines the

format. The Kantian concept of synthesis is the idea of constructional activity, and this became Harré's concept of the causal power of human agency. In honor of the revolutionary import of the concept, I will call this the Harré theorem. In sociology, the Harré theorem can be seen to provide the much needed philosophical foundation for the Thomas theorem that 'if people define situations as real, they are real in their consequences'. People are able to define situations as real precisely because the making of such definitions, and much else, is the power of real human agency. This is a first formulation of the Harre theorem. Warner uses this to build his conception of our constitutive sociality with the aid of social symbolic interaction theory from the Cooley and Mead tradition. The key idea that I want to examine is the social nature of freedom, the agentic act itself as self-mobilization (Warner, 1990: 134-138). This is certainly the heart of the darkness of modern individualism.

What is it about modern possessive individualism, that makes it, in true Dostoyevskyan fashion, fanatically, and if need be, murderously possessive? My proposal is that the heart of its darkness -- its (secular) religious fanaticism -- is freedom; the absolute right and duty to be free. In the story of Dorian Grey, for example, the darkness of its heart, its murderosity, becomes exactly that. The sin of Dorian Grey is the willingness of self to murder another who may and does intervene in the exercise of that right to freedom as duty, and who violates that freedom by conditioning it. Sartre was not quite on the mark in his frenzied exclamation that 'hell is other people'. That hell is complemented by the sin of Dorian Grey who murdered his close friend because he was conditioning Dorian's freedom to be an absolute individual. Warner's insight into this situation is to recognize that the individualist thesis is wrong in its deep assumption that the nature of freedom and the very logic of agency is individualistic (Warner, 1990:137-138).

The modern mechanistic-nominalist model of the individual is grounded in the root assumption of the original separation of the individual from others: the nature of the individual is individual. This idea of original separation means that agency was itself viewed as individualistic. This would seem to provide a most interesting insight into the dogma of possessiveness that is constitutive of modern individualism. The assumption of separation is the principle defining the core of the doctrine of absolute freedom, which in turn constitutes the justification for the sin of Dorian Grey. And yet, the fundamental logic of individualism is fatally flawed, and so

the moral objection to the 'other' in the name of freedom is now no longer easily justified.

If indeed people are social, and thus personally exemplify the Harréan theorem, then how could the mechanism of self-mobilization be individualistic? If one could seriously accept the incoherency of the kind of question mentioned earlier, namely, 'where is the explosion before the dynamite is detonated?', then surely one would perforce have to believe that self-mobilization is a species of mysterious spontaneous generation. After all, the principle in that kind of question is metaphysical, suggesting an occult ontology of natural kinds (the substance/quality model is presumed) such that there is a mysterious region, for instance, 'within' the stick of dynamite wherein its explosions are located. If so, then self-mobilization is asocially and autonomously generated. In that case Freud was right all along: the 'id' is the site of the primordial agency of personality! Warner flatly denies that an individualist account could in principle be coherent. Self-mobilization is social precisely because one can only direct oneself to respond -- in this case, to another -- only in so far as one considers how the other will respond in turn to one's own response. Warner concludes:

Thus it's not because of what they are made of that the hidden generative processors . . . of the psychoanalytic tradition, cognitive psychology, and Chomskian linguistics can't possess the powers to produce speech-informed action. It's because they are conceived to operate individualistically (Warner 1990:137-138)

Neither an asocial complex organism or some part of it can be agentic in the human sense. Only when an organism is also a person, who, because of enculturation, is social in being and in taking action as a person, can human agency be real -- a productive force. Causal agency requires that the structural integrity of a natural kind is not violated. The positivist assumptions of materialism (material reductionism) and individualism (asocial organism), presupposed by experimental design and informing the behavioral scientists who are so committed, lead to the construction of theories of people that violate the socio-cultural structural integrity of the human being of people. It is because of this philosophical position that the person is improperly lost, and with it social action and its cultural content.

An individualistic conception entails the tacit assumption of an asocial organism and thus in principle

cannot account for the real enactment of human agency. Now this principle liberates us to a fresh appreciation of the role of the human organism in human forms of life. We are liberated to comprehend that Freud's 'id', Merleau-Ponty's 'lived-body', Sheets-Johnstone's 'body-logos', and Jackson's 'knowledge of the body' (1989:119-136), can indeed be set aside as sensitizing but inadequate attempts seriously to implicate the body and movement in the intimate social affairs of persons. Certainly, as sensitizing concepts functioning somehow to insure that Darwinian biology is never to be forgotten, and functioning to insure that somehow the arts of movement might be remembered, they deserve to be appreciated. Body and movement, however, can never be seriously introduced into social living either from the psychoanalytic or the existential phenomenological standpoints. Their individualistic position compels them to assume the concept of an asocial complex organism in their attempts to incorporate body and movement into cultural life.

The body, however, is the indexical site of the person. Indeed it is a body because of the person, thus bodily movement is an agentic option available to people in their person-centered social actions. But to say this is exactly not to say that such agentic display is enacted by the organism because persons are natural individuals. This locution betrays the conflation of the organism with the body. It is no longer a proper form for the preservation of human agency and its existential value.

The transformation of natural into personal powers through the social mechanism of what Shotter calls "psychological symbiosis" (1973:143-147) enables us properly to order the relationships between the concepts of organism, person, action, and causal powers. The grounding site of natural powers is the asocial and material individual organism. This, however, is only the enabling condition for the exercise of agency. Its enactment requires the engagement in social acts through personhood and the resource of a concept of an entitative self. The difference between the enabling condition and the engagement is radical: only the organism grounds our natural powers, while only the social act grounds our personal powers. Hence, our everyday display of powers belongs to the person and not to the organism, and that is because their enactment can only be accomplished socially, not individually (Warner, 1990:138-141). The agency of the person is a social affordance, never an intentionality of the body. Bodily intentionality is a personal affordance, and that is because we are social. The concept of bodily-intentionality within an individualist framework is a form of Ryle's category mistake. It conflates the social grounding of our personal

powers with the organismic grounding of our natural powers, in which case, the consequence is that body and organism are improperly connected. Neither 'experience', nor 'livedness', alone, can convert the organism into the body.

The cultural variability in theories or myths of personhood and the self, means of course that social life creates forms of persons and selves, while the asocial and material organism is virtually constant. Yet, the last point is not quite right either. The principle of the personal affordance of the body because of the social affordance of personal agency, allows a fresh understanding of the relevance of physical states to personal agency. Social practices in different cultural forms of life not only create actions that human asocial organisms could never produce, but those new actions represent the self-mobilization of both the person and the organism. Any resulting physical states are therefore certainly mediated by the organism, but they can only be generated by self-mobilized persons because of their culturally-informed social engagements (Warner, 1990:140-141). Thus, the organism may be relevant to an understanding of person, self, and action, because of validly correlated physical states. It is nevertheless clear that relevance can never be declared in the traditional form of a biologically original causal explanation. Any resultant gestural and other movement patterns found to be correlated to personal self-mobilization can certainly be attributed to the organism of a body/person, but again, that must be sociologically conceived as the condition of material mediation; that is, its generation is socially grounded and personally enacted. The organism is an individual entity, but the body is a cultural entity--it is embodied in a substantial person. Thus the body is made visible by the invisible social act of being a person. Bodily-intentionality, in the context of the cultural model of the ethogenic standpoint, is the enactment of personal being.

The Jacksonian Move: a Dead-end for a Merleau-Pontian Anthropology of the Body

I will conclude this extended discussion with reference to Jackson's intent to achieve a Merleau-Pontian anthropology of the body. The point I wish to make is that the Jacksonian move is another instructive example of the 'body-dead/brain-dead' axiom in the social sciences. Most social scientists are endemically dead to the body, and more important, they are dead to the semiotics of bodily movement. There is an inability to see people 'meaning' when they are moving, whether or not they are speaking, and especially when they are not speaking but engaged in action-

signs. Investigators may notice that people are moving and doing so significantly, but it ends there. The inability to apperceive such movement as action is due directly to the prohibition of understanding that such action is meaningful. Social scientists are body-dead because they are conceptually brain-dead to signifying acts within the semiotics of body-movement. As a consequence, there is the systematic neglect of the fact and importance of literacy in the performance and study of human movement. A position seriously championed by Drid Williams for well over a decade (1975, 1979, 1982).

It is, then, not surprising that some may argue, even in principle, against any such position, but this is rather odd. It is quite clear that both the sciences and some of the arts require their appropriate forms of literacy. Not to acknowledge this forces one into the incoherent position of insisting, for the sake of consistency, that, for instance, western baroque, classical, romantic, and modern tonal and atonal music would have emerged and developed in the absence of musical literacy and its correlative notation systems. In the case of tonal music there is one notation system, while in that of atonal music there is a plethora of such systems (Ferrara, 1991:1-31). But Sheets-Johnstone tacitly suggests the dismissal of movement literacy and its correlative notation systems and Jackson does so explicitly.

The result is not only that this involves one in an incoherent position regarding western music and literacy, but there is the professionally alarming consequence that renouncing movement literacy closes-off future developments of with regard to research, knowledge, and understanding concerning movement systems. The deeper point is an underlying issue concerning the suitable expansion of our conception of rationality beyond the restrictive version provided by the positivist tradition. This issue will itself be foreclosed by any such dogma against literacy. Intellectualism (deductivism, efficient rationality, formal rationality) may well entail literacy, but the reverse is not necessarily true. Both musical and movement notation systems strongly suggest exactly that. It is high time that the fight against the bogeyman of intellectualism, and therefore against literacy, in the name of new forms of imagination, being, and feeling, be abandoned.

In the revolt against positivist science (as a powerful example) both the neo-Wittgensteinians and the new realists have won the battle to dethrone the hegemony of an intellectualist paradigm of rationality. Thus, for instance, Harré has recently made the strong point that scientific rational practices are predominately material practices (i.e. using equipment and instruments for

searching and finding) with some 'thinking', and a severe stricture on deductivism (Harré, 1986a). The power of literacy is the provision of new and systematic methods, techniques, and procedures, for the facilitation of new forms of imagination, being, and feeling.

In the twentieth century, the revolt against the rationalism of traditional tonal music emerged in the form of atonal music. The revolt was facilitated through the invention of new notation systems, and not without--or in spite of--them. In reference to movement, the resort to the Merleau-Pontian body cannot realize that facilitation of our authorship. Movement literacy is that kind of new social act designed and enacted by persons for new paths of facilitation.

Four of the truly powerful sources of the revolt against the intellectualist paradigm of rationality are phenomenology (Husserl's final emphasis on rationalism's foundation in the Lebenswelt), hermeneutic phenomenology (Heidegger's Dasein as the poetry and depth of Lebenswelt), existentialism (Sartre's existence against essence finally combined with Marxist-inspired sociologism), and existential phenomenology (Merleau-Ponty's embodied being-in-the-world). The renunciation of movement literacy and its correlative notation systems has its origin, ultimately, in that philosophical and rational anti-intellectualist revolt.

Jackson articulates that influence unambiguously in the thesis that the anthropological emphasis on intellectualist rationality and language necessarily excludes the proper emphasis on the body, gesture, and movement, in the everyday affairs of cultures (Jackson, 1989:119-122). To understand his perspective on the issue, consider a select number of integrally connected statements found in the introductory essay to his collection of anthropological papers (1989):

Anthropology . . . urges us not to subjugate lived experience to the tyranny of reason or the consolation of order . . . (p. 16).

. . . [an] escape from lived experience is provided by the intellectualist notion that knowing is a kind of outside beholding rather than a matter of participation (p. 15).

. . . the separation of subject and object in traditional empiricism is in large measure a function of the sensory mode and metaphor it privileges: vision (p. 6).

The alienating effects of visualism can also be related to the impact of perspective and literacy (p. 6).

Literacy has the effect of isolating us and our ideas from the lived world of social experience (p. 10)

Now if it is true that linear perspective and literacy prevent coevalness, then there is a good case for trying to understand the world through bodily participation (p. 11).

From the foregoing discussion of new realism and the ethogenic standpoint, it is clear that Jackson's thesis must be rejected as is; it is simply of secondary importance. The Merleau-Pontian body may be conceptually sensitizing, but it is not conceptually adequate. The individual organism is a material entity, but the body is a cultural entity and it is embodied in a substantial person. Thus the body is made visible by the invisible social act of being a person. Heidegger's being-in-the-world or being-with-others does not save Merleau-Ponty's use of the term body from its conceptual inadequacy. From the ethogenic standpoint that usage means that Merleau-Ponty picked up the wrong end of the stick. It is not the case that the 'subject is his body', but rather that the 'subject is an organism' and becomes his body when the individual becomes a person. The body is a personal affordance, and that is because the person is a social affordance. Thus, the personal enactment of a semiotic system of action-signs especially brings the 'body' into view, so to speak.

In light of the above, the test of the thesis that a Merleau-Pontian anthropology of the body is a dead-end is the fact that neither Sheets-Johnstone nor Jackson ever present any empirical data or ethnographic descriptions of the body, gestures, or movement. It must be made very clear that they cannot do so in principle, and so they will never be able to do so in fact. This is an endemic feature of their conceptual commitment to existential phenomenology. Thus, they may not talk about the body and so avoid the intellectualist fallacy, but they can only talk of the body and so are trapped in the phenomenalist fallacy. Recalling the earlier discussion on the materialist, phenomenalist, and dynamical models of matter, we can clarify the meaning of this new idea of the phenomenalist fallacy in the present context. The intellectualist fallacy is rooted in the materialist substance/quality model and the existential phenomenological perspective is rooted in the phenomenological substance-less quality model. Thus the new idea of the phenomenalist fallacy. Talk of the body is first-person pronoun talk centered in the rhetoric of

subjective experientialism. That this is absolutely the case is evident from the list of Jackson's statements, and especially in view of his comment from the same introductory essay:

But while I agree with both Foucault and Lévi-Strauss in eschewing any notion of the individual subject as the primary source and final arbiter of our understanding, I do not want to risk dissolving the lived experience of the subject into the anonymous field discourse, allowing Episteme, or Language or Mind to take on the epistemological privileges denied to consciousness and subjectivity (emphasis supplied) (Jackson 1989:1).

Neither Jackson, nor anyone else for that matter, can have it both ways. You cannot reject the "individual subject as a primary source" of understanding and at the same time affirm the "epistemological privileges" of the "consciousness and subjectivity" of the individual subject, and pretend to be able to do so with a magical resort to "lived experience" that mysteriously baptizes experience with the reality of, well, yes, substance! You are either in the materialist camp and you have substance, or in the phenomenalist camp and you have qualities, but you cannot have both. And if the issue is the "primary source" problem -- that is, that substance commits you to a substratum apart from its qualities -- then neither "livedness" nor "experience" can be a substitute for substance conceived of in that materialist sense.

What you can do, however, is to reject both the materialist model of substance and the phenomenalist model of quality, and accept in their stead a dynamical model of the immateriality of substance as the structure of powers and forces. Jackson reveals his preference for the astronomer's term "singularity" in reference to a suitable concept of the subject, but a dynamical model rather than a phenomenal model is the better choice. In other words, without a proper understanding of causal powers, the ethogenic view of person and sociality, and without the distinction between organism and body articulated by the concept of the internalization fallacy, the incoherence and sterility of the Jacksonian move with its preference for a phenomenalist model of quality cannot be overcome.

As a result, that resort cannot be the means of realizing Merleau-Ponty's invitation to connect language and gesture. Jackson's commitment to Merleau-Ponty's existential phenomenology to the exclusion of his venture into philosophy of history was one mistake; to then regress

to James's radical empiricism was another, and it was fatal. Together they guarantee that the Jacksonian move is a degenerate form of Merleau-Ponty's vision and reach, since what is further guaranteed is that talking of the body can never graduate to talking from the body. To talk from the body is not only to experience the body as a lived-organism, but to enact the movement of the body and to thus experience it (if that is your phenomenological interest). This enactment is in the first-person standpoint of an author creating and using the semiotic of an action-sign system. The implication of this position is that movement scores are ethnographically superior to word-glosses because they are recording talk from the body. The movement itself is read and described, hence literacy cannot be denied its centrality in an anthropology of human movement.

The existential-phenomenological and the new realist standpoints informing these forms of report are radically different. It has been my contention throughout this essay that the studies of movement systems found in semasiological and some other anthropological approaches presuppose a conceptual framework best understood in the terms of Harré's ethogenic standpoint and the new realist philosophy of science that generates it. It is this framework and standpoint that permits us, I believe, to realize Merleau-Ponty's invitation to reach the semiotics of signifying lingual and action-signs.

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