Review Essay

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"Evolving Modes of Inquiry" is an awkward subtitle for this book, because after reading it, I wonder what has evolved. Shelly Berg's essay, "The Sense of the Past: Historiography and Dance" (pages 225-248) offers evolution in the sense that it is commonly understood in the academic world: change within the clear boundaries of a disciplinary commitment, and that is important since so many contributions in the book lack this clarity. Berg's chapter is well-written, outlining the role of the dance historian so that readers understand the commitments these professionals have to the discipline of history in general, both with reference to traditional and more recent styles of writing. History as a discipline is never maligned, over-ridden or simply ignored, which is not the case with Green and Stinson's treatment of the sciences and social sciences, more of which later.

Joan Frosch ("Dance Ethnography: Tracing the Weave of Dance in the Fabric of Culture," pp. 249-280) is clearly committed to an anthropological approach to the study of dances because of the kinds of questions she asks and some of the issues she raises. Admirable features in Frosch's contribution turn around the notion of "Striving to understand indigenous categories, rather than superimposing categories of our own" (p. 250), and the question, "What are our responsibilities to the people whose lives and cultures we study?" (p. 269). However, several people she draws upon are not anthropologists (e.g. Sklar, Drewel, Fuller Snyder) nor does she make clear what role the disciplines of social and cultural anthropology are meant to play in Performance, Cultural, or American Studies.

I was surprised that Frosh recognizes Ten Lectures on Theories of the Dance (Williams 1991) solely for a "touching revelation" made in the preface. It was equally surprising to read that the 'Exercise in Applied Anthropology' (Williams 1991: 287-321) is characterized as an "apology." In the 'Exercise' I made a strong distinction between amateur and professional anthropology, pointing out that my efforts as an untrained amateur were simply dead wrong – not to be taken seriously by anyone. One also wonders why the subject of Choreometrics (p. 256) is given so much attention. Surely talking about Choreometrics at length risks giving novice students the impression that Lomax's work remains of interest when it was long ago discredited by

This author allies herself so closely to sociocultural anthropology, that one wishes she had read Farnell’s introduction (1995: 1-11) where the changes that have occurred in anthropological studies of the dance and human movement since 1980 are explained. One hopes that in future Frosch will consider seriously what Wolcott says:

Unfortunately, in the enthusiasm for adding “ethnography” to an already ample set of labels for qualitative approaches, educational researchers are in danger of losing sight of what the term has meant, who has used it, and the special features of “ethnography” that distinguish it from other terms either equally distinguishable ... or comfortably broad (e.g. case study; naturalistic research). Today one hears ethnography suggested as a synonym for case study, as an adjective describing a special kind of educational evaluation, and even as the label for a research broadside where investigators insist they haven’t a clue about what they are going to be looking “for” or “at.” Whatever ethnography is, a considerable number of [dance] educational researchers today claim to be ready and able to do it (Wolcott 1980: 56 - italics added).

On this topic, readers would find Kaeppler’s recent essay on the mystique of fieldwork (this issue) illuminating and helpful, as are Pocock (1994[1973]), Williams (1994), and Varela (1994b) on ‘personal anthropology’, self-reflexivity, and objectivity respectively.

Unlike Frosch, many anthropologists would disagree with Tony Seeger that “Ethnography should be distinguished from anthropology ... since ethnography is not defined by disciplinary lines or theoretical perspectives” (1992: 258). Despite what non-anthropologists try to make of it, ethnography is a particular kind of descriptive approach including theoretical content and commitments to the disciplines of social and cultural anthropology.

Any and Everybody’s ‘Performance Ethnography’

I digress here briefly from the book under review to illustrate what can happen when ethnography is taken away from anthropology. As Wolcott (this issue) puts it, many people “look like anthropologists but ... do not think like them. From an anthropological point of view, their work can be highly problematic. A perfect example can be found in the book, Seize the Dance! BaAka Musical Life and the Ethnography of Performance (Kisliuk 1998). I agree with Franken’s review (2000) that this book provides a splendid example of how not to do ethnography. Why? Because it is about the author, it is not about the BaAka people. It turns out to be an imbroglio of theoretical and disciplinary issues generated by trendy, post-modern, performance ethnography. Having said that, in the interests of fairness, I am obliged to let Kisliuk speak for herself:

I define the ethnography of performance in part as a narrative evocation of interactions and meanings of performance – that is, enacted culture – wherein the role of the ethnographer must be written into the text, not as the usual dry, pat description of the
author or, at the other extreme, as a heroic “character” ... but as a continuously interwoven awareness and exploration of the interpersonal negotiations, power dynamics, and epistemological grappling involved in research and writing.... Importantly, my use of “experience” here is not as a passive (“it just happened to me”) or vague claim of “authenticity,” but rather as an account of particular circumstances of human investment and interaction that disrupt epistemological complacencies and reconfigure identities (Kisliuk 1998: 12-13).

The crucial issue is readily defined by asking the question, ‘Whose performance’? A detailed example from the book will illustrate the problem.

In December, 1998, Kisliuk was in her hut, ill with malaria, when some BaAka people visited, hoping she would come to a special social event that included singing, dancing and drumming. They were on their way to Bagandou to become officially initiated into Mabo, the most popular BaAka dance. In spite of difficulties, Kisliuk promised to “try her best” to meet them at the dance site. She took some quinine and felt better, but was visited by Bagandou’s police commissioner who felt responsible for a sick foreigner in his jurisdiction. Feeling better that evening, she went with Justin (her major informant) to the eboka, but on the way there, she became disoriented and ill again which resulted in a fall into a muddy pool. Changing her clothes and wearing Justin’s shoes, they finally arrived at the eboka. She tells us that “I was embarrassed that [Justin] had given up his footwear because of me” (1998: 30). Apart from appearing on the scene to invite her to the eboka (1998: 28), the BaAka disappear completely. So also does the Mabo. Readers are not told what bearing her illness and expressions of self-sacrifice have to do with the dance or the initiation she attended. Kisliuk provides no explanation about how such experiences are connected with the fieldwork she was supposed to carry out: she simply asserts that all of a researcher’s experience is important, quoting Sklar to support her claim.

I find Kisliuk’s ethnography theoretically and methodologically challenged, to say the least. If the first thirty pages of the book are any example of what it means to “write poetically about matters of cultural process and political urgency,” then I think many readers will fail to understand such “poetry,” as I did. Kisliuk tells us that a vision as a graduate student led her to New York University’s Performance Studies program, which is “a place where ‘art’ and scholarship were not split and where formal academic disciplines had little authority to dictate what one would study” (1998: 11). Unfortunately, it is perfectly clear that no academic discipline had any authority over her work, with the possible exception of ethnomusicology, which pertains to the musical analyses she did, which, for all I know, are excellent. Her so-called “ethnography of performance” is far from excellent, however. Seize the Dance! is one of the worst books I have ever encountered on dances and dancing because it is a book about Michelle Kisliuk. The BaAka and their dances serve as nothing more than an impressionistic backdrop for the author’s narcissistic use of her own personal experience. This prompts me to say that I hope Joann McNamara’s contribution to the
collection under review ("Dance and the Hermeneutic Circle," pp. 162-187) is not a slippery slope to ethnography of this kind, although I am sure the author would be perplexed by my suggestion.

McNamara’s essay is a (selected) overview of philosophical work that is compromised by its attempt to say too much within the limits imposed by a twenty-five page essay. McNamara asks, ‘What are the Strengths and Weaknesses of Hermeneutic Inquiry for Dance Phenomena?’ (p. 170ff), but it is highly probable that her discussion is inaccessible to students and scholars unfamiliar with the work of Gadamer or Rorty. She states that, “The hermeneut does not attempt to reproduce or objectively represent reality, but, rather, builds an interpretation via a blueprint of her or his own design, and through logical argumentation” (p. 171). This statement is wide open to serious misinterpretation and misuse, especially from those who read only with a view toward what they think they can use. It can be read as an open ticket to writing whatever someone happens to fancy – provided the writing possesses some kind of ‘logic’ to hold it together.

From Personal Experience to Movement Analysis

As I read Researching Dance, I was reminded of two statements in Powers’s criticism of Hanna’s book, To Dance Is Human:

Finally ... we are given future directions and a recapitulation of just about everything that just about everybody has theorized about the universe—as it potentially pertains to dance research and communications. ... In general much of what is arrogantly passed off as semiotics is an uncritical assortment of theories in physical anthropology, archeology, socio-linguistics, cultural anthropology, communications theory, structuralism, symbolic analysis, etc. ad infinitum. Dance is simply stuck onto these existing interdisciplinary theories as if it were a self-conscious appendage. (Powers 1984: 51 – italics added).

Hanna presumably tried to impress anthropologists when she wrote To Dance Is Human, but it is difficult to imagine who Mary Alice Brennan’s recapitulation attempts to impress. Brennan avoids any critical evaluation of modes of movement analysis, which is problematic, especially with regard to Laban’s system of ‘Effort-Shape’. Most anthropologists hesitate to use Effort-Shape analysis because it is based on ethnocentric European classifications of spatial dimensions and dynamics. The system may be of value regarding Euro-American dance styles, but it is not suitable for cross-cultural work.

Near the end of Brennan’s essay she writes, “The question of validity, the accuracy with which evaluation devices reflect the concepts they purport to measure, is barely touched upon in dance movement analysis” (p. 300). While it is true that the validity and accuracy of “evaluation devices” are rarely examined in movement analysis, Brennan neither answers the question nor addresses the problem. She does, however, advance behavioral and experimental accounts of movement analysis (those focusing on muscle measurement, statistical analysis, experimental method, etc.) under the sub-
heading 'Reliability and Validity' (p. 299ff), inferring that non-behavioristic accounts lack both. The old beliefs in universality and 'science' seem to have become set in stone, thus I have to ask, where is the evolution here?

And Now, "Dance Science"

Steven Chatfield's contribution to this volume is frankly refreshing because he does not try to include everything and everyone into his essay. He is only interested in discussing experimental scientific method, the stereotypes that exist about it, and how problems are solved by using such methodology. He also explains some types of experimental design. Chatfield speaks of a kind of research that defines human bodies as physiological organisms, conceiving of human bodies as conglomerates of measurable physical processes only.

The kind of research to which he is committed flows out of a mechanical model of human beings and does not take language, culture, spatial contexts, performativity, deixis and indexicality into account. Chatfield's work is based on the premise that scientific explanation of data is achieved through correlations of non-random patterns of movement described in terms of causal mechanisms. Doing work of this kind means accepting traditional concepts of the behavioral sciences, i.e. that 'things' (including people) are substances with qualities, whose 'behavior' is explainable in terms of S-O-R (stimulus-organism-response) theory.

Chatfield appears to know what he is doing and he knows what his type of work is about. He writes clearly and well. He does not invite criticism or argument with the problems of experimental method with reference to dances or dancing because that is not what his work is about. He does not mention the method's limitations, nor does he raise issues outside his chosen theoretical frame of reference. He claims that

The broad array of topics under investigation promise to identify the effects of dance training and the demands of performance, confirm training preparation for the onset of medical problems. When medical problems do arise, research can help assess the efficacy of therapeutic protocols and the level of rehabilitation necessary for a safe return to dancing (page 154).

One can only agree that this is what experimental, basically kinesiological research is for, and Chatfield carries out his work in "dance science" in a philosophical and methodological paradigm that is generally accepted and privileged as 'science'. It assumes that 1. Dance is a form of behavior. 2. All forms of behavior can be scientifically examined. 3. Therefore, dance can be scientifically examined. However, as David Best rightly points out, "This argument is undeniably valid, yet ... although all behaviour can be scientifically examined that is certainly not to say that the only legitimate explanations of behaviour are scientific" (1997[1978]: 73).
I wonder if Chatfield would be interested in non-behavioristic approaches to researching dances? There are some theories that are diametrically opposed to his. They are based upon premises that define human beings, not as 'organisms', but as embodied agents performing signifying acts – approaches that conceive of human bodies as having unique powers and capacities that avoid the old Cartesian (and Merleau-Pontian) problems. Semasiology, for instance, flows out of an anthropomorphic (not mechanical) model of human beings. Unlike any form of behaviorism, it does take spatial context, performativity, indexicality and deixis into account, which means that scientific explanation is achieved via descriptions of individuals with powers, acting and reacting upon self, other people and things. Finally it means accepting a neo-realist conception of the sciences and social sciences (see Harré and Madden 1975). That is, people are seen as active agents, thus human acts and actions are treated as the realizations of potentialities created in space by powerful individuals.

One of Chatfield’s aims is an attempt to “temper the stereotypical notion of scientific methodology as a formulaic set of rules that everyone must follow” (p. 124).6 Unfortunately, his message did not reach the editors of Researching Dance and at least one pair of contributors (Green and Stinson). I will investigate the latter after examining what the editors, Fraleigh and Hanstein, consider to be a dominant theme of Researching Dance.

Qualitative and Quantitative Inquiry

The cliché opposition “qualitative and quantitative inquiry” persists in dance education in spite of the fact that there are striking theoretical and methodological differences among the sciences and social sciences, and in spite of the fact that there has been considerable discussion on these matters in the educational field for some time now. Fraleigh and Hanstein’s editorial preface would have been greatly improved had they been informed by Howe and Eisenhart (this issue):

The proliferation of qualitative methods in educational research has led to considerable controversy about standards for the design and conduct of research. This controversy has been playing itself out over the last several decades largely in terms of the quantitative-qualitative debate. In this paper we argue that framing the issue of standards in terms of quantitative-qualitative debate is misguided. We argue instead that the problem of standards ... is best framed in terms of the “logics in use” associated with various research methodologies. In particular, rather than being judged in terms of qualitative versus quantitative paradigms, logics in use, which are often drawn from other academic disciplines and adapted for the purposes of educational research, are judged in terms of their success in investigating educational problems deemed important (Howe and Eisenhart 1990: 2).

Instead, Fraleigh and Hanstein tell us that “The quantitative researcher wants to know what is “true” for a given population or phenomenon, and under what circumstances” (Preface, p. vii). They also say,
qualitative research studies qualitative values (it stands to reason). These are
experiential values concretely defined as: educational, social, cultural and cross-
cultural, developmental, linguistic, aesthetic, mythological, symbolic, and so on (Ibid.
pages vii-vii).

Evidently, Fraleigh and Hanstein use qualitative and quantitative modes
of inquiry as a somewhat superficial expression of the science/humanism
debates, which had their roots in the seventeenth century (see Toulmin 1992:
42-44 and 69-70). The persistence of the opposition can be explained by an un-
examined assumption that ‘science’ is a homogeneous discipline which can
be regarded as a generic block – a heap of activities that are somehow related
(e.g., Eisner 1981; see Howe and Eisenhart [this issue] for a view from
education opposed to Eisner’s). Saying this does not deny that there are a few
similarities among the sciences (conclusions based on evidence, accurate
reporting, and such), but ‘science’ is not one thing, it is many.

Of course, to regard science as anything other than unitary denies one of
the major concerns of seventeenth century thinkers and their ‘Quest for
Certainty’ (Toulmin 1992: 35-36). Between the eighteenth century and the
nineteen-twenties and ‘thirties, the rationalist quest for certainty in the form
of positive knowledge dominated Western thinking. Under this rubric, the
concept of a unitary science was coupled with the notion of a unitary scientific
method. Unfortunately, this outdated idea pervades Green and Stinson’s
essay, and to add insult to injury, they include the social sciences under their
“umbrella.”

The social sciences arrived later on the scene of modern research and, seeking legiti-
macy, adopted the orientation of hard science; the extension of scientific methods to
the study of human beings is referred to as positivism . . . We use the term
postpositivist as an umbrella term to describe the variety of approaches to research
that have arisen in response to a recognition of the limitations of the positivist
tradition in research (pages 91-92).

Postpositivist Research in Dance

Green and Stinson refer to Auguste Comte’s variety of positivism in the
following way:

This term [positivism], coined by August [sic] Comte during the Enlightenment, origi-
nally referred to a philosophy that advocated that the logical, systematic study of
science be applied to human affairs in order to better human lives . . . We acknowledge
that the term positivism today has political connotations, if not derogatory ones. As
philosopher of science Sandra Harding notes, “Opinions are divided about whether one
should discuss the remnants of positivism under that name. Some natural scientists,
many social scientists, but almost no philosophers of science will happily describe
their own philosophy of science as positivist. Other observers are quite sure that no one
at all is really a positivist any more, so to criticize positivism (or ‘excessive
empiricism," as some of us have called it) is only to criticize straw figures” (1991: 57-
58). Despite the shortcomings of the term, we join many contemporary researchers in
using it to discuss the limitations of traditional scientific research in the study of
human beings because no other term has yet emerged (p. 114 - note 2).
One has to ask, 'Do these authors mean post-Comtean positivism or post-logical positivism?' There is little doubt that Comtean positivism had adverse effects on the study of dances, but these effects are discernible in specific ways:

To Comte, the history of thought can be seen as an unavoidable evolution composed of three main stages: (1) the theological stage, during which anthropomorphic and animistic explanations of reality in terms of human wills (egos, spirits, souls) possessing drives, desires, needs, predominate; (2) the metaphysical stage, during which the "wills" of the first stage are depersonalized, made into abstractions, and reified as entities such as "forces," "causes," and "essences;" and (3) the positive stage, in which the highest form of knowledge is reached by describing relationships among phenomena in such terms as succession, resemblance, coexistence. The positive stage is characterized in its explanation by the use of mathematics, logic, observation, experimentation, and control.

Each of these stages of mental development is thought to have corresponding cultural correlates. The theological stage is basically authoritarian and militaristic. The metaphysical stage is basically legal and ecclesiastical and the positive stage is one characterized by technology, industry and science. The evolutionary fulfillment of these three stages in the history of thought is "Progress" and that, too, is thought to be inevitable.

The sciences, in Comte's schema, are conceived of as one unified whole, but they, too, are in differing stages of development and are related in a hierarchical order of dependency. For example, Comte thought that astronomy must develop before physics could become a field in its own right, just as biology must reach a given point of sophistication before chemistry could begin its development (Williams 1991: 68-69).

Comte never said anything about dancing, but Sir James Frazer used Comte's ideas to fit dancing into a scheme of stages of human intellectual development. Frazer's stages included a progression from magic to religion and from religion to science. With specific reference to dancing, Frazer's emphasis was on the magic to science connection. Non-western dances were classified as exemplars of magic. Frazer thought that "primitives" called on magic when their capacity to deal with situations realistically was exhausted. Magic thus provided a substitute reality: if a tribe could not really make war on a neighboring village, then it could at least do a dance about it. Dancing was classified as a form of sympathetic magic. The doctrine of sympathetic magic maintained that a copy of a thing may influence a thing itself at a distance (Frazer 1911: 540. The clearest examples he gives are those of rain-making and sun dance rituals (1912: 13-18 and 22-23).

Comtean positivism thus engendered the notion of social evolutionary stages of human 'progress', which influenced Frazer, who developed his own stages and created the notion of sympathetic magic, but,

Mistaken ideas about the mental capabilities of so-called 'primitive people' and a lack of close attention to the art itself are the basic ingredients of a recipe for misunderstanding. It was, in fact, this combination that led to one of the earliest interpretations of Bushman rock art - sympathetic magic. . . . At the beginning of this century, sympathetic magic was considered to explain the Upper Palaeolithic art in such European cave sites as Altamira and Font-de Gaume. Researchers who had spent much of their lives studying the French and Spanish art brought the idea to southern Africa.
This explanation was never as widely held in southern Africa as it was in Europe because there is no evidence that the Bushmen believed in sympathetic magic of that kind and because the art seems to be too diverse for so restricted an explanation (Lewis-Williams and Dowson (1999[1989]: 23-24).

Popular notions about evolution, magic, 'primitives' etc. always lag far behind educated discourse, thus it is important to note that Frazer’s notions of sympathetic magic and Comtean positivism were abandoned by social anthropologists long ago. The point of this long explanation of Comtean positivism is this: if Green and Stinson are going to offer “postpositivist” types of research, they might at least inform readers about the various elements of ‘positivism’ they wish to reject.

The nostalgia for the certainties of 17th century philosophy that motivated this alliance of positivism with formal logic, notably within the “unified science” movement, is hard to overlook. The effects of this nostalgia were not all happy. As the sciences progressively extended their scope, between 1720 and 1920, one thing working scientists did was to rediscover the wisdom of Aristotle’s warning about “matching methods to problems”; as a result, they edged away from the Platonist demand for a single, universal “method”, that of physics by preference. In the 1920s and 1930s, philosophers of science in Vienna returned to the earlier, monopolistic position (Toulmin 1992: 154 - italics added). The philosophers to whom Toulmin refers were a group of philosophers, all logical positivists, collectively referred to as “the Vienna Circle,” whose ideas flourished in the United States for many years, partly because some of them fled to America to escape Hitler’s Germany. But, of what did their ideas consist, and what contemporary status do these ideas hold?

Central to logical positivist doctrines is the principle of verifiability: the notion that individual sentences gain their meaning by some specification of the actual steps we take for determine their truth or falsity.... Famously, some say infamously, many positivists classed metaphysical, religious, aesthetic and ethical claims as meaningless. For them, as an example, an ethical claim would have meaning only in so far as it purported to say something empirical. If part of what was meant by ‘x is good’ is roughly ‘I like it’, then ‘x is good’ is meaningful because it makes a claim that could be verified by studying the behaviour of the speaker. If the speaker always avoided x, we could verify that ‘x is good’ is false. But the positivists typically deny that ‘x is good’ and similar claims can be assessed as true or false beyond this sort of report. Instead, they claim that the primary ‘meaning’ of such sentences is ‘emotive’ or evocative. Thus ‘x is good’ (as a meaningless utterance) is comparable to ‘Hooray!’ In effect this sort of analysis shows the positivist’s commitment to the fact-value distinction... After the Second World War these doctrines of positivism, as well as the verifiability principle, atomism and the fact-value distinction, were put under attack by such thinkers as Nelson Goodman, W. V. Quine, J. L Austin, Peter Strawson and, later, by Hilary Putnam and Richard Rorty. By the late 1960s it became obvious that the movement had pretty much run its course (Fotion 1995: 507-508 - italics added).

Although logical positivism shared some of the spirit of Comtean positivism, partially reviving the seventeenth century desire for certainty, it became popular in America much later. With regard to the dance, it was Susanne Langer, who in Philosophy in a New Key (1951[1942]) represented herself as a
"heretic" when she was bold enough to go against logical positivistic doctrines (although she did not embrace phenomenology).

As Fotion points out, logical positivism may have "run its course" among philosophers of science, but it has obviously not done so in dance or art education. Using the words 'positivist' and 'postpositivist' uncritically and in non-specific ways raises all of the old specters. Logical positivism is still with us, although not in the forms Green and Stinson presume. For example, modern positivists are still tied to problems of objectivity because of the verificationist principle and a lingering belief in the fact-value distinction:

The problem of objectivity, then, is the problem of the positivist view of objectivity. That view is now rejected as inadequate and a new view of objectivity is required ... Objectivism (in its insistence that being objective meant being value-free) was, therefore, insisting that knowledge was impersonal. Polanyi and Kuhn can be understood to be in essential agreement that objectivity is not value-free and knowledge is not impersonal. Polanyi, of course, specifically demanded that this meant that knowledge is personal: "knowing" is a decision - not simply a conclusion - and a decision is a value-permeated rational judgment whose universality is both committed to and responsible for.

The decision is made by and for a knower. Therefore, the person becomes a necessary part of any understanding of knowledge (Varela 1994b: 43-44).

In semasiology, the notion of 'objectivity' is closely tied to self-reflexivity as set forth in David Pocock's 'Idea of a Personal Anthropology' (1994[1973]: 11-42). To many people, subjectivity and objectivity represent a dichotomy; there is no room for self-reflexivity. However, not all philosophers are prepared to treat the social sciences in the same manner as the natural sciences, therefore, discerning readers would be well-advised to read Peter Winch's admirable book, The Idea of a Social Science and Its Relation to Philosophy (1990[1958]).

Another exegesis closely related to the dance is David Best's skillful eight paragraph summarization of the problem of objectivity and subjectivity in art education, only one of which is reproduced here:

[T]he most damaging aspect of such educationally fatal subjectivist assumptions [that the arts need not be taken seriously because they are concerned with 'feeling', rather than with cognition or understanding] is that they are asserted not primarily by the detractors of the arts, but as doctrinaire articles of faith by the supporters of the arts, who persistently fail to recognise that to deny the objective, rational, cognitive content of artistic experience is to deny any legitimate place for the arts in education. Thus these "supporters" defeat their own case (Best 1996: 1).

Green, Stinson, and Postmodernism

Green and Stinson confute Comtean positivism with logical positivism and miss the connection that modern remnants of positivistic ideas have with subjectivity and objectivity. They then provoke further criticism by conflating a generic 'science' with an equally generic 'social science' which they presumptuously include in "the positivist tradition in research."
What these authors say about adopting "the orientation of hard science" may still be true of some approaches within the social sciences, but this is far more prevalent within the disciplines of sociology and psychology than sociocultural anthropology, which has its own origins and development. Specifically in social anthropology, one could say that Radcliffe-Brown and (to a lesser extent) Malinowski, were advocates of adopting a 'scientific' orientation, although many others, including E. E. Evans-Pritchard, were against this idea. Perhaps the lesson here is that unsubstantiated generalizations about whole disciplines are ill-advised. American cultural and British social anthropology are very different from one another, although they claim a few common ancestral figures, and they are, in turn, very different from sociology and psychology - much more so today than they may have been at the turn of the twentieth century.

Why Not Postmodernism?

One wonders why Green and Stinson employ the term 'postpositivism' in their essay, since postmodernism seems more appropriate to describe the variety of approaches they advocate. Perhaps they adopted the new label because of postmodernism's reputation:

Perhaps the greatest difficulty in discussing postmodernism is the impossibility of discerning any clear account of what it is. As Carr (1995: 123) puts it, there are numerous postmodernisms: "each theorising the meaning of post modernity in a different way." To compound the difficulty, much of the literature on postmodernism is characterised by arcane obscurantism, a porridge of abstract verbosity. Indeed, I confess to scepticism even about the term "postmodernism." What comes next? I have already read of "post-post structuralism" (Pride 1993). One can envisage post-post modernism... Moreover, it has become fashionable, trendy, so that some people, perhaps especially in the arts, but also in academic life, use it as a label behind which they can attempt to justify vapid, pretentious work by accusing those who can see no value in it as behind the times (Best 1999: 1).

One could agree with Green and Stinson if they wished to overturn theorizing based on universal scientific, aesthetic or artistic principles that are conceived to be independent of sociocultural contexts. It would have been helpful if they had tackled any of the many issues that arise because of positivism in either of its major forms. If their main message is that conventional language is a determining factor of human experience and thought, then they are to be congratulated, but this idea is certainly not new. Semasiologists look to Whorf (see Carroll 1956) and E. Ardener (1989[1971]) in anthropology, Wittgenstein (1958) in philosophy, Saussure (1966) in linguistics and a host of others as pioneers and perpetuators of such ideas. It would be easy to produce an avalanche of citations from linguistics and sociocultural anthropology over the past thirty years to prove that

reality is socially constructed - that we construct reality according to how we are positioned in the world, and that how we see reality and truth is related to the perspective from which we are looking (Green and Stinson, page 93).
Do these authors really think that they (or postmodernists) are the originators and only users of these ideas? Are they also unaware of the alternatives, for example, to the ‘fragmented’ or ‘decentered’ self of the postmodernists, who reject the idea of an integrated, unified ‘self’?

A central criterion for personal identity, for the character of the self, as some of us have argued for years, and as postmodernists emphasize, is the culture, the language and other social practices, of one’s environment. To put it succinctly, it would make no sense to suppose that I could be the same ‘I’ if I had been born and brought up in 10th century Mongolia (Best: 1999: 9 - italics added).

Suffice it to say that neither the social sciences nor the so-called “hard” sciences are single disciplines, nor are they rightly regarded as generic blocks. There are many sciences and many social sciences. On the whole, they have always been open to new approaches. Especially is this true of sociocultural anthropology. The evidence for this assertion is compelling: it is documented in Susan Reed’s essay, ‘The Politics and Poetics of Dance’ (1998). Moreover, the paradigmatic shifts in anthropological studies of human movement are thoroughly discussed in Farnell (1999b) for anyone who cares to understand what the shifts are and how the displacement from observationist views of behavior to a conception of body movement as dynamically embodied action came about. This was a real evolution in modes of inquiry.

“Engendering Dance”

Jane Desmond’s contribution to this book is entitled “Engendering Dance: Feminist Inquiry and Dance Research” (pp. 309-333). The American Edition of the Oxford Dictionary and Thesaurus defines ‘engender’ as follows: 1 give rise to; bring about (a feeling, etc.). 2 archaic beget. See CREATE (p. 476). Desmond, however, defines ‘engendering’ as if it includes gender categories (i.e. en-GENDER-ing) and how these categories generate meaning.

I think a better title for Desmond’s essay would have been, ‘Gendering Dance’. According to Desmond, she chose to focus on work by Mark Morris that makes the staging of gender and sexuality central to its choreography. But it is important to stress that the staging of sexuality occurs in most dance forms and social dance practices in the United States, past and present. What’s different about work like Morris’s is just that he challenges and makes explicit that which is usually either implicit, or so naturalized it is regarded as an integral part of the aesthetic, like the romantic, stereotypic heterosexuality of the classical pas de deux form (p. 324).

Desmond says

Sexuality studies prompt us to ask new questions about dance. How does bodily [danced?] movement signify sexual desire, and what is the relationship of such desire to gendered positionings? How are our perceptions of those engendered sexualities related to social and material practices? These new questions can further illuminate feminist inquiry of dance, unsettling presumed linkages between biological sex, sexual-
ity, and gender. In turn, we can contribute to feminist scholarship by revealing the intimate links between the construction of desire, kinesthetics, and social power (p. 324). 12

I cannot include myself in the friendly “us” of Desmond’s first sentence, and I suspect many others would have the same problem. I would also oppose the notion that women are determined by their biology in any particular way — an idea that Simone de Beauvoir successfully opposed without making the kinds of distinctions that Desmond does. A statement from Meryl Altman’s critical review of Toril Moi’s new book, What is a Woman? And Other Essays is pertinent here. In the review, Altman speaks positively about an earlier book Moi wrote:

In a careful reading of the opening chapter of The Second Sex Moi gives us back what Beauvoir actually said about the body, which is basically, yes, men and women are different; So what? Many things have followed, from sexual difference and embodiment, but no particular thing need follow from it in any concrete instance. The important thing about the Beauvoirian body is that it isn’t just a sexual body. It eats, it sleeps, it dies, it climbs trees. Sometimes the most important thing to notice about it is that it’s the body of a woman, or of a man, and sometimes that’s not the most important thing.

My suspicion is that most feminists will continue to find the distinction between sex and gender helpful in everyday use — particularly if we live and work where the understanding that biology doesn’t trump all other sorts of explanations of behavior cannot be taken for granted. Still, permission to stop worrying about it so much — to stop worrying it to death — does feel like a breath of fresh air in a very stale room (Altman 2000: 7 - italics added).

Just as there are many different “post-modernisms,” there are many different species of feminism, but, like Green and Stinson’s ‘science’, Desmond’s ‘feminism’ is treated as a generic block, which simply isn’t the case in the real world. Although Perceiving Women (Ardener, S. 1977) has nothing to do with dancing, I think Desmond and other readers interested in this topic might find the book helpful, for in it, there are several essays that speak for women in quite different ways.

Maybe we would understand what has ‘evolved’ in feminist inquiry with regard to dancing and/or research into dances had Desmond answered the questions she asks in her footnote. The connection is not clear from Desmond’s essay in Researching Dances.

Limitations

Sondra Fraleigh’s philosophical underpinnings remain strictly phenomenological despite serious criticisms of a phenomenological approach to dancing (and dances) over the past seventeen years. As is well known, Maxine Sheets-Johnstone wrote the only book we possess about phenomenology and [the] dance, but Fraleigh has little to say about her work, except that it exists. Criticisms of The Phenomenology of Dance (Sheets-Johnstone 1966) largely centered around objections to phenomenology itself as a study of the essence of consciousness. Sheets-Johnstone’s essay ‘Interdisciplinary Travel: from Dance to Philosophical Anthropology’ (1983),
was effectively criticized, specifically in relation to the dance and human movement, in an essay by Charles Varela (1983). My objections to phenomenology in Ten Lectures (1991: 79-80), center on its denial of ontological existence to dances. In addition, two graduate students at New York University in 1982, (Rajika Puri and Diana Hart-Johnson, both distinguished dancers) tackled the problem of improvising vs. composing (see JASHM 2(2):71-88, reprinted in Farnell (ed.) 1995) in which they provide concrete reasons for their dissatisfaction with a phenomenological approach. I know of no other critiques except theirs, Varela’s, and mine, that address problems specifically relating to phenomenological approaches to the dance. I have to ask myself what this means.

Fraleigh’s first article in Researching Dance, entitled ‘Family Resemblance’ (p. 3-21) is headed by an epigraph using a well-known Wittgensteinian phrase. This essay is innocent of any mention of Sheets-Johnstone or of Fraleigh’s use of phenomenology. The writing seems to amount to an annotated list of what [the] dance “is” and what it “is for.” However, in her second article, ‘Witnessing the Frog Pond’ (Chapter 7), she does say,

Phenomenology, with its concerns for the body, also introduces new streams of thought to the growing field of dance aesthetics. Maxine Sheets-Johnstone builds upon Langer’s dance aesthetics and brings phenomenology into aesthetic discourse on dance in The Phenomenology of Dance (1966). From the perspective of existentialism and also employing phenomenology, I later develop a descriptive aesthetics in Dance and the Lived Body (1987). 14

As Anglo-American analytic philosophy becomes more enamored with scientific justification (or “physics envy” as it has been called), existentialism and phenomenology explore emotional life and the irrational as philosophic themes, just as feminism later identifies an ethics of care as a viable alternative to an ethics of justice. The combination of existentialism and phenomenology (termed “new existentialism” by Colin Wilson) evolves a philosophy of the body in protest against essentialist views. Its descriptive psychological stance, searching out the truth of the body-as-lived, develops a unique method for investigation in dance aesthetics and somatic studies. Sparshott feels the work of defining a field of dance aesthetics takes on new significance within phenomenology’s repudiation of body/mind dualism. 19

Phenomenology’s nondualist project as originally set out by Merleau-Ponty is still unrealized in philosophy. His ideas have nevertheless been subsumed (and updated) by cognitive science on one hand and hermeneutics on the other. In France, his direct heirs are Michel Foucault and Jacques Derrida, imported to America more as literary theorists on deconstruction than as philosophers. The respect for the body that is a key concept in emerging feminist aesthetics draws upon the rejections of dualism first incorporated in the “lived body” paradigm of phenomenology but now extends this to concerns for how our bodies mediate culture and may be used to sustain oppression. Dance aesthetics, we might understand, is either explicitly or implicitly an aesthetics of the body. We can also read it as a discourse and history of the body. (Fraleigh 1999: 207-208).

There are at least three major difficulties here: first, in The Visible and the Invisible, Merleau-Ponty introduced the notion of “flesh” rather than the body, in a new attempt to explore how people are caught up in what they see when they are engaged in an act of seeing. Shortly before he died in 1961, he
came to realize that his earlier conception of the body was still tied to the Cartesian dualistic metaphysics that he had committed himself to challenge. For that reason “flesh” was not presented in opposition either to the mind or to the world, but as an ‘element’, much as air, fire and water are elements. As Varela points out, it is unfortunate that this work was not complete when he died, because “flesh is a rich but confused sensitizing notion and not a definitive conception as Merleau-Ponty left it. . . . As such it must be judged under the auspices of causal powers theory to be a mystification and not a promise” (1994a).

Second, although I have not read Wilson’s The New Existentialism, I wonder how it “evolves a philosophy of the body in protest against essentialist views,” when the originator of phenomenology, Edmund Husserl, developed it as an essentialist theory of knowledge at the beginning of this century. After 1913, it developed into a form of idealism. Husserl’s phenomenology asserted that not only is there a direct perception of instances of, say, a color, but there is also a direct perception of the “universal” that is associated with the color. He postulated an “eidetic intuition” by means of which people are supposed to have knowledge of the essential features of the world. Phenomenologists called these universals “essences.”

Perhaps some enterprising student of the dance or philosophy (or both) would be interested in telling us how the new existentialism evolves a philosophy of the body in protest against essentialist views — and which of the four grades of essentialism were rejected. I would be especially interested in detailed explanations of how the new existentialism pertains to perceiving dances, dancers or the dance, foregoing Fraleigh’s insistence that we view aesthetic questions in terms of witnessing frog ponds, and the delight we are meant to take in these creatures’ jumps (p. 188).

Third, it is a commonplace in political discourse to say that Americans tend to “throw money at problems,” as if doing so will somehow solve them. It seems that many writers in the dance and dance education field assume that throwing more books at intellectual problems will achieve similar results. This is why the paragraphs and endnotes Fraleigh wrote about phenomenology are reproduced here. One wonders how the cited books support her commitment to a phenomenological approach? Are readers meant to assume that Fraleigh uncritically accepts everything cited? Does she expect graduate students to do so as well? She does not mention phenomenology’s critics and detractors, although no theory is without them. Thoughtful assessments and evaluations of any approach include the criticism of opponents, as well as self-criticism, because commitment to an approach involves understanding the flaws in it. However Fraleigh remarks (also in Chapter 7),

If a path of inquiry opens certain views, it also imposes limits. As streams in philosophy and literary criticism still developing in the latter half of the twentieth century, phenomenology and its relatives, deconstruction and postmodern criticism, risk
maintaining a focus on Eurocentric aesthetic values, redrawing its rankings and outlines, rather than substituting new maps. Feminism also risks ethnocentrism and a joining of the patriarchal culture it hopes to expose, deconstruct, and overcome politically, entering the "battleground" on prevailing terms. We are coming to a time when intellectuals and artists outside the white mainstream will broaden the base of dance aesthetics, as a recent publication of the Dance Critics Association demonstrates.

This implies that Fraleigh is perhaps aware of the limitations of phenomenology, deconstructionism and postmodernism, but I would have preferred to read a thoughtful essay from her regarding their "focus on Eurocentric aesthetic values," instead of conceiving of this as a "risk" taken by other authors. She seems aware of the "battleground," but does not reveal herself as an adversary. Here, I was again reminded of Altman's review of Moi, and a statement toward the end where she says she has come to find the "adversary paradigm" less irritating and more politically defensible than the woolly-minded all embracing civility that cushions "us" against being asked hard questions, both on grounds of a J. S. Mill-like view that truth emerges from controversy and on Beauvoir-type grounds of honesty and authenticity. Beauvoir was not the only girl who noticed that you had to choose, not always but a lot of the time, between being smart and being nice; she decided that the second alternative destroyed both the mind and the heart (2000: 7).

To some extent, I sympathize with all of the authors' predicament in the essays they wrote for Researching Dance. It is impossible to write a general overview of a field (an 'approach' or whatever) and at the same time, do justice to specific problems within designated page limitations. One could perhaps start with a sub-heading "General overview" out of which one or two problems that are seen as primary are selected. My advice would be to consider the audience carefully: is this a book written primarily for graduate students or is it for general readers? Is it a book written for professionals in other disciplines?

Research

"Research," Penelope Hanstein says, "is a confusing term; it has so many meanings and applications that it is difficult to understand precisely what we mean when we speak about research in a scholarly sense" (p. 22). The statement is contentious because most academics are not confused by what it means to carry out research in their own disciplines. Beginning students may be confused when they are undergraduates in anthropology, for example, but during the course of their study, they are introduced to the terms that pertain to research in the 'four fields' that characterize American anthropology. At a graduate level, they take courses that deal with the basic structures of argument, with the kinds of techniques, theory and method that are used in their chosen field.

In most programs in Great Britain and the USA, they are introduced early on to the kinds of writing, documentation, etc. that are characteristic of social anthropology. They spend a lot of time working out what "ethnography" is
and what it entails, and at a graduate level they have discussions with their tutors or advisors about these subjects, such that, by the time they are finished with their formal education, they have very clear ideas about what 'research' means in the discipline. I believe the same is true of most academic disciplines. 'Research' is not a confusing term in academic communities, although it may be confusing in popular discourse, where the most trivial questions and answers are often naively called 'research'.

In this essay, I ... have tried to show some of the practical consequences involved, as e.g., a far superior approach to the ethnography of dance and human actions than I was capable of producing without the anthropological perspective and without the kinds of disciplined approach to [the] ethnography [of dances] I would now advocate. The paper is mainly addressed to those who would venture into the field as I did, to do "research" on their own: an interesting and instructive thing to do, but which in the end has little to offer a wider readership than one's friends and acquaintances (Williams 1991: 289).

Had I undertaken the study of history instead of social anthropology, I would have learned to "plan and approach the gathering, analysis and interpretation of... data in systematic [historical] ways" (Hanstein p. 26). Likewise for those who study chemistry, literature, philosophy, mathematics, or any other academic discipline. To ask "What is Scholarly Research?" as Hanstein does on page 22 is simply naive.

The naïveté is not mitigated by observing that she apparently writes for undergraduate (possibly graduate) students. On the contrary, it simply underlines a point made earlier when the question was asked, "for whom was this book written?" which in turn draws attention to a larger problem, the disciplines to which the word, 'dance' is attached. A cynical friend of mine believes that the reason for all of the assumed names i.e. 'dance science', 'dance ethnography', 'dance history', 'dance aesthetics', 'dance ethnology', 'dance hermeneutics,' 'dance research', 'dance anthropology' etc. ad infinitum is simply to sell books. The more disciplines, or fields of study attached, the more readers it will attract - or so conventional wisdom would have it. Following Power (1984) I would have to say that 'dance' is simply stuck onto these existing disciplines as if it were a self-conscious appendage (see page 390 above), and this is not a trivial point.

The whole history of scholarship, whether in the natural sciences or in the humanities, tells us that the mere collection of what are called 'facts' unguided by theory in observation and selection is of little value.

Nevertheless, one still hears it said of anthropologists that they go to study primitive peoples with a theoretical bias and that this distorts their accounts of [other peoples], whereas the practical man of affairs, having no such bias, gives an impartial record of the facts as he sees them. The difference between them is really of another kind. The student makes his observations to answer questions arising out of the generalizations of specialized opinion, and the layman makes his to answer questions arising out of the generalization of popular opinion. Both have theories, the one systematic and the other popular (Evans-Pritchard 1969[1951]: 64, italics added).
It is not clear what 'theories' Hanstein advocates for 'dance', unless we accept the notion that 'dance' can appropriate theory willy-nilly from any other discipline it chooses without taking into account the commitments, ethics, etc. that go along with them, or, by simply taking a single element out of context, which may seriously distort the original disciplinary orientation.27

On page 256 of Researching Dance, Frosch asks the question, "What Shall We Name the Baby?" limiting her discussion to anthropologically connected words, but it is easy to expand the question to other disciplines, and, ultimately, to an (apparently) unintended inference Hanstein makes. By keeping 'dance' uppermost in their minds, she indicates that it is all right for doctoral students to appropriate sociological, anthropological or philosophical 'methods', purposes and problems if they follow the sophomoric program of questions outlined for each: see Examples One, Two and Three, (Empirical Inquiry, p. 35, Ethnographic Inquiry28 p. 36, or Philosophical Inquiry, pp. 36-37 respectively). What I would like to see are Hanstein's justifications for using research methods from other disciplines. If, as Howe and Eisenhart point out, education is a field of study rather than a discipline. That is, it must bring to bear other disciplines - psychology, sociology, and anthropology, to name a few - on educational problems" (1990: 4).

Then credit should be given where credit is due - not to mention accountability.

I think it is detrimental to the development of any field of study if students are being taught to crib from sociology, anthropology and philosophy in these ways, and I believe that other academics would agree with me. I wonder if all this is being done under the aegis of 'Education'? I would like to read an essay by Hanstein on the 'philosophy' that guides her cavalier approach to other academic disciplines, and her justification for including other disciplines in her program. If, with books like this, dance scholarship is making a bid for academic respect among other members of university communities, then it behooves them to learn the rules, but there is more to the problem that the dance education world faces than that.

A "Unified Field of Dance"?

The aim of Researching Dance: Evolving Modes of Inquiry seems to turn around the idea of creating or producing a "unified field of dance" (another generic concept). The editors say,

As we summarize our evolving understandings of dance, our actual dances and evolving modes of inquiry are creating a field of participation and studies of interest in the academies where DANCE ENTERS into disciplines of more historically established fields. . . . Will those of us who teach, study, and practice the states of movement and mind that we have named dance sustain a contiguous field, or splinter into separate disciplines as our respective methodologies become more specialized? Will 'dance' become defined and appropriated by other disciplines? We would argue for retaining
some cohesive strategies that embrace a unified field of diverse studies based on a broad interpretation of the word dance (from 'Unified Field Postscript', page 353).

Fraleigh and Hanstein ask, "Will dance become defined and appropriated by other disciplines?" If we follow their prescriptions in Researching Dance, the question is rather: 'will anthropology, philosophy, sociology, psychology, education, linguistics and 'science' (or any "more historically established field") become defined and appropriated by 'dance'? In this book, Chatfield, Berg and Perpener appear to operate within their chosen disciplines. Fraleigh still advocates the type of philosophy she chose years ago. Frosch has chosen anthropology, Brennan sticks to dance notation and effort-shape, Desmond focuses on the sexual body and "sexuality studies," although it is doubtful if these types of study would throw much light on the act of dancing in any culture. Green and Stinson seem bent upon redefining dance research in postmodernist terms – whatever that means. McNamara advocates a type of research where "an interpretation via a blueprint of her or his own design" will prevail over any attempt to reflect, reproduce or explain reality.

As editors, Fraleigh and Hanstein say, "We would argue for retaining some cohesive strategies that embrace a unified field of diverse studies based on a broad interpretation of the word dance" (page 353). The collection of essays in this book fail to inform readers about the "cohesive strategies" that are meant to unify these diverse studies.

**Conclusion**

In order to finish this review of Researching Dance on a more positive note, I left the last essay in the book ('Cultural Diversity and Dance History Research' by John Perpener, pp. 334-351) until last. Like Chatfield's work, there is nothing offensive in Perpener's writing. He has good points to make and he writes well. I am not as much of a fan of Joyce Aschenbrenner as he is, but that is hardly significant. I am an enthusiastic fan of Brenda Dixon-Gottchild's work, however, and the opening and closing paragraphs from my review of Waltzing in the Dark: African American Vaudeville and Race Politics in the Swing Era (Dixon-Gottchild 2000), will serve as an appropriate conclusion to my comments on Researching Dance.29 The citations below specify characteristics that one wishes were in Researching Dance, but are not.

First paragraph: This book is excellent. On a scale of 1 to 10, it rates a nine or ten on all criteria for reviewing. 1. Dixon-Gottchild sticks to her subject and argues an extremely complex case with authority, aplomb and ease; 2. She aims to make visible the "invisibilized" African American dancers and dances of the swing era, and she does exactly that, accomplishing her aim in a thoughtful, skillful exegesis of black swing-era history; 3. She says,

This work is about race and art, two contested constructs that are laden with connotations. They are as controversial as religion and politics, and all four concepts intersect and interfere with one another: we speak of the politics of race or art, of art or race as sacred, while race and religion may determine the trajectory of art or politics (2000: vii).
By the time readers have reached the end of the book, they have gained valuable insights into race and art, the sacred, and politics. If readers do not understand how these combined concepts “determine the trajectory of art or politics,” then they can only blame themselves, not the author.

Last paragraph: In the ‘Finale’ to Waltzing in the Dark, (pages 228-230), Dixon Gottschild summarizes the legacy of the swing era to art and entertainment in America. Her last word is poignant, witty and – like all of her writing – true:

“Without the black swing era legacy, our world would be diminished. What would we do, if we weren’t all so black and blue?”

Well, Brenda, we could certainly do a lot better, for a start, and maybe because of your book, and the knowledge and outstanding scholarship it represents, we will.

I am sure that Perpener would see Waltzing in the Dark as a fulfillment of the kind of history of American dance forms that he finds lacking, as, indeed, I do.

Notes

1 Comments such as, “For me to be sick now felt exceedingly unfair ...” “I tottered and slowly plopped into the water, which was muddy and full of little red worms that eat the debris of manioc peelings.”

2 A list that does not include David Best, which is odd, because Best’s work has for years focused on philosophy and human movement (1978) and feeling and reason in the arts (1985). Even if Best’s philosophy of dance education and art education is opposed to McNamara’s ideas, he is too distinguished a scholar to be blatantly ignored.


4 The incomplete sentence is McNamara’s – not a typographical error.

5 This is exactly what Kisliuk did.

6 I wish he had also made the point that “scientific methodology” does not solely consist of the set of rules and the kinds of experiments he talks about.

7 of JASHM 10(4) (1999) is particularly helpful here, with reference to Julius Gould’s admirable essay on Auguste Comte, pp. 213-218.

8 For ideas about how physics has developed, see Wolf (1981) and for the differences in social science methods, see Diesing (1971).


10 There are dangers in producing generic notions of ‘art’ as well: see Best (1995).
The term ‘sociocultural’ combines British social and American cultural anthropology, which, as professionalized disciplines are barely one hundred years old. Social anthropology as an academic discipline, began in 1907 with Frazer’s appointment to Liverpool University. In America, Franz Boas taught the first American Ph.D. in cultural anthropology at Clark University, where he was not in residence long. He moved to Columbia University and the subject as a formal discipline might be said to have begun there in 1899 when Boas became a Professor (see JASHM 10(4) for the “founding fathers” of British social anthropology and JASHM 11(2) for the beginnings of professionalized American cultural anthropology).

[Desmond’s note 44] I develop these issues further in my article, “Embodying Difference: Issues in Dance and Cultural Studies,” Cultural Critique 26 (Winter 1993-1994); 33-64.

It is said that “politics creates strange bedfellows.” Evidently dance research does too.

[Fraleigh’s note 60]: Sondra Fraleigh, Dance and the Lived Body (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1987).


22. See Fraleigh's note 62 above.

23. [Fraleigh's note 69]: Avanthi Meduri [1992] provides a critique of "The Western feminist gaze" and its cultural oversights regarding Indian classical dance in "Western Feminist Theory, Asian Indian Performance, and a Notion of Agency." Her critique raises (aesthetic) questions about the supposition that the use of "less space" in a dance necessarily implies "less freedom" for the dancer. The more, the bigger, the better? We need to notice that we often use the language of dominance in our aesthetic valuing, not to mention our tacit acceptance of power as the conquest (of space, of nature, of ourselves, of others) — thus our perpetuation of what we seem to criticize. The "inner space" of the dancer’s consciousness (in dance as in life) is a more complex study than the dancer’s actual occupancy of the space around her body (page 221).


25. Moreover, there are books available written by anthropologists, or collections produced by members of the professional association (Assoc. of Social Anthropologists - ASA; American anthropological Association -AAA) on appropriate subjects.

26. My friend also believes that my insistence on 'science of the dance', 'anthropology of the dance', 'history of the dance', 'aesthetics of the dance' (or dancing) and such, makes too subtle a point for many people to understand. I would argue that 'the anthropology of the dance' instead of 'dance anthropology', for example, establishes an accurate relationship between the discipline of anthropology and dancing (the act), or dances (empirically perceivable performances) and 'the dance' (a phrase that refers to all dances anywhere in the world).

27. There are alternatives, of course. When I taught the anthropology of the dance and human movement at New York University from the Dance and Dance Education Department, I made it a requirement for the M. A. course that members of the anthropology department had to read (and pass) the theses produced by the candidates for the degree. Students were also required to attend graduate courses in the anthropology department.

28. Which is not included under 'empirical' — one wonders why not?

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